


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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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WEST GERMAN INVESTMENTS IN NATION REPORTED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 19 Jun 82 p 2

[Text] The West German Government wants to increase German investments in Greece. It would not object if the country were to receive greater support from the EEC.

It would even accept that some flexibility be shown in the interpretation of the EEC rules, so that the conditions under which Greece became an EEC member be improved.

These were the conclusions drawn from yesterday's meeting between members of the Union of Foreign Press Correspondents and Federal Germany's Minister of National Economy Otto Graf Lambsdorff. The West German official held repeated meetings yesterday with representatives of the Greek Government and of the major opposition groups.

A main subject discussed during the 2-day meeting was that of German investments and the Bonn government views about the Greek memorandum to the EEC.

Mr Lambsdorff said in his interview, that because West Germany has a free economy, the decisions on investments in Greece will be made by West German private businessmen who have already expressed, however, an interest in investing in the fields of chemical and pharmaceutical industries.

The German official noted, however, that no specific discussions can take place unless the Greek Government clarifies its investments policy.

The German businessmen, he said, would like, before making an investment, to know that there is a clear and steady policy on issues such as financing, pricing, controls, obligations in exports, etc.

The fact that the Greek Government has completed the new development law that includes various incentives, he added, is very encouraging and will lead to an increase in investments.

The German cabinet minister also said that only 480 million marks have been invested in Greece; this amount, he said, should be increased.

Referring to the Greek memorandum on special EEC arrangements in favor of Greece, Mr Lambsdorff said that the German Government has found the initial answer by the EEC Committee as satisfactory; he added that his country will declare itself in favor of a flexible interpretation of the EEC laws and regulations so that a solution can be given to Greece's special problems.

He said the German Government accepts that the amount of aid that can be granted to Greece by the EEC, can be increased.

8193

CSO: 4621/406

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM FIND IN THASOS--Rich high-quality oil deposits have been discovered at Prinos I, but the official announcement will be made after drilling and combustion tests are completed. DEP [Public Petroleum Corporation] representatives who are following up the developments as well as the Northern Aegean Oil Company have informed DEP that there are indications that there is oil and gas in the area. In the meantime, the Northern Aegean Oil Company yesterday confirmed that oil was discovered at the drilling site at North Prinos I, 30 miles west of Thasos in the Kavala Gulf, and at a depth of 2,800 meters. As mentioned earlier, the company will make detailed announcements after completion of the drillings that will reach the depth of 3,200 meters. Combustion tests will follow and all data on quality and quantity of oil and gas will be made public. The company does not preclude the possibility that the new oil deposits might be larger and of better quality and free of sulfur. [Text]
[Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 19 Jun 82 p 14] 8193

CSO: 4621/406

NO RISE PLANNED IN INDIVIDUAL'S SHARE OF MEDICAL COSTS IN 1983

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Jul 82 p 3

[Article by Morten Malmo: "Own Contribution Will Not Grow Next Year"]

[Excerpts] Even though the work on the government's 1983 budget is far from finished, Minister of Social Affairs Leif Arne Heloe said that no increase in own contributions is planned for health services next year. Minister Heloe points out that reduction in planned hospital expansion will give room for increased investments in other areas. "We will strengthen care for the elderly, and help for the mentally retarded and psychiatric patients will be better," said Heloe, who also wants a higher priority for child care.

Will the government, in the budget for next year, plan for an increase of own contributions for health care? Work on next year's budget is far from being completed, but there are no plans for such increases.

As previously announced the Ministry of Social Affairs will make a report to the Storting on the use of own contributions and which principles in this area should be worked for. Possible recommendations will not take effect from 1983.

9287

CSO: 3108/136

NEW RECORDS REACHED IN TOTAL UNEMPLOYED, JOBLESS YOUTH

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Jul 82 p 7

[Text] The crisis in the labor market is growing worse. The number of unemployed rose to 131,000 in June. That is the highest figure ever recorded for that month, and it is 45,000, or 52 percent, higher than a year ago. Women and young people are being especially hard hit.

In June of this year, 52,000 young people under the age of 25 were unemployed. That is also the highest figure ever noted for June, and it can be compared to 36,000 unemployed young people a year ago.

That information comes from the latest labor market survey by the SCB (Central Bureau of Statistics). In June, 3 percent of the labor force--131,000 people--was unemployed. In May of this year, the figure was 116,000. The increase is greater than the usual rise between May and June.

Of the total 131,000 unemployed, about 35 percent had been without a job for over 3 months.

Summer Jobs

In June, a total of 4.3 million people were employed, compared to 4.23 million the year before. The increase is due to the fact that students are working at summer jobs.

Industry employed 1.03 million people in June. That is 13,000 fewer than last year.

According to the AMS (National Labor Market Board), unemployment among members of the unemployment benefit societies totaled 73,800, and that is 22,600 more than at the same time last year.

The number of newly reported job openings in June was 50,200, or about 4,000 fewer than during the same period last year.

Layoff notices were received by 5,600 persons in June. The number of notices from January through June was 31,300, compared to 26,900 a year earlier.

In June, 46,500 people were employed in relief work. That is 22,300 more than at the same time last year and 8,600 fewer than in May. Of those employed in relief work, 29,100 were under 25 years of age.

Labor market training involved 23,600 people in June, or 4,200 more than last year and 10,700 fewer than in May of this year.

In all, 132,000 people were benefiting from labor market measures in June.

Unemployment in the forestry counties was 3.8 percent in June, compared to 2.0 percent in the major urban counties and 3.4 percent in the other counties in southern and central Sweden. The corresponding figures for May were 3.4 percent, 1.9 percent, and 3.0 percent, while for June of last year they were 2.7 percent, 1.6 percent, and 2.0 percent.

Worse This Fall and Winter

The number of unemployed will probably increase further this fall and winter. This will mean markedly higher unemployment than during the corresponding period last year.

That assessment is made by the National Labor Market Board (AMS) in a report on developments in the labor market. The report is based in part on interviews by the county employment boards with a large number of firms.

Big problems are expected in construction activity, where the demand for manpower is expected to decline further.

The AMS says in its report that no marked increase in industrial demand for manpower is expected before the end of the year, although the bottom has probably been reached in industrial activity. The utilization of capacity in industry is extremely low, meaning that production can increase considerably without the need to hire more people.

As before, unemployment is expected to affect many young people, especially those without vocational training. Other newcomers to the labor market, especially women, can also expect the rugged labor market situation to continue.

Many of those hit by unemployment over the past year have remained unemployed for a long time, says the AMS report. The number of people collecting unemployment insurance for the maximum period is rising. From every indication, that development will grow worse during the fall and winter.

The labor market situation varies markedly on a county-by-county basis. This regional imbalance is not expected to change markedly during the fall and winter.

In the forestry counties especially, unemployment will continue to be considerably higher than in the rest of the country.

BRIEFS

INDUSTRY ORDER BOOKS DOWN--According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, Swedish industry's order book situation is still poor. From March through May, the volume of new orders for industry as a whole declined by 3 percent in comparison with the immediately preceding 3-month period. The drop originated in the export market (down 8 percent), since new orders from the domestic market were up by 1 percent. From March through May of this year, deliveries for industry as a whole were 2 percent higher than in the same 3-month period last year. The volume of deliveries was up in both the export market (up 4 percent) and the domestic market (up 2 percent). [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Jul 82 p 6] 11798

CSO: 3109/202

KIEP, DREGGER ON GREENS, COURSE OF CDU

Kiep on Party's Course

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 19 Jul 82 pp 31-32

[Interview with Walther Leisler Kiep, member of the CDU Presidium: "'We Have To Go From Transmission to Reception'"]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Kiep, you recently said that all parties, including your own, shared considerable "responsibility for the rise and growth of the Greens and Alternatives." This really is something quite new from the lips of a Christian Democrat.

Kiep: There is no doubt but that the development of the Greens and Alternatives can be traced in large part to a lack of performance on the part of the Bonn parties. This is true especially of the government parties but of course also of the CDU.

SPIEGEL: Wherein lies the CDU's share of the responsibility?

Kiep: In the face of growing difficulties in the world, the parties have been unable to give all those who were anxious a feeling of security and confidence in the parties' ability. All too often the parties have portrayed themselves as associations whose exclusive business purpose it is to maintain themselves in power or, as regards the opposition, to gain power. The representatives of protest, the Greens and Alternatives, however, also do not have an answer to the crucial questions which are to be solved.

SPIEGEL: You, however, want the CDU to become amenable to the topics of the Greens--more protection of the environment, less nuclear energy, and disarmament?

Kiep: We have to be in a position at times also to go from transmission to reception and to be ready to check our stands self-critically in a dialogue with persons holding different views. Not in order then to abandon these stands immediately, though!

SPIEGEL: You have recently voiced the criticism that the CDU has been listening too long to the nuclear energy lobby. Are you calling on your party to change its previous course of speeding the expansion of nuclear power?

Kiep: No. But in the seventies we followed exaggerated energy forecasts without examining them. This led to a huge program which as time passed was qualified again and again. In those days people's fear of this new type of energy was underestimated, and the "do or die" statement--if you don't have nuclear energy, the lights will go out--was too unqualified. This led to disappointments among thoughtful and anxious persons.

What is pending today--construction of the nuclear power plants provided for in the Federal government program--I consider reasonable, also from the environmental point of view in that additional coal power plants will destroy nature.

SPIEGEL: Despite the fact that, as you have said, you want to switch "to reception," you are continuing to transmit the same old tune. For example: Almost 100,000 CDU supporters demonstrate for counterarming, 350,000 people (mostly young ones) demonstrate against it. Surely it is not possible to get them together.

Kiep: As I said at the CDU demonstration in Bonn on 5 June, the Western alliance will break up if in the future and at present it portrays itself as a kind of armored consumers cooperative.

Defense is not just a question of tanks and planes; it is also a question of convincing people that a defense of this society is worthwhile. It is therefore vital for us to talk less about weapons--necessary though they are--and more about policy, in order to prevent the impression that we too have come to believe that weapons might replace policy.

SPIEGEL: For many people of the generation of protest, the CDU is "the missile party." Are the young in fact still listening to you?

Kiep: A small minority is no longer ready to do so but prefers to shout us down. A large skeptical group can be persuaded, however; I am quite sure of that. I can understand the fear and malcontent of people in this year of 1982 when they look at the world we live in.

Because charity, of course, should begin at home, I think it is a good thing, for a start, to wonder where we ourselves have failed--the government and, of course, also the opposition accompanying it.

SPIEGEL: In other words, an end to nuclear weapons?

Kiep: The nuclear deterrent cannot be done away with from one day to the next. We should not, however, accept it as a permanent state of affairs for the rest of this century but should try to support this fragile edifice of world peace with pillars of greater security and greater permanence--controlled disarmament, armament control and treaties which make was impossible.

SPIEGEL: The people of the peace movement have demonstrated to to you that for tens of years nothing has come of disarmament negotiations.

Kiep: The armament burden has reached such dimensions that no nation--certainly none in the East but not we in the West either--can put up with it as a permanent state of affairs. Weapons systems, it turns out, are increasing with each new generation not just by the rate of inflation but several times over, with the result that even big powers find it difficult to go on like that.

We can see that also in the case of the Bundeswehr [Federal Armed Forces]. I definitely see chances of success in this area.

SPIEGEL: Bureaucratization and donation deals have also contributed to dissatisfaction with the parties. Your role, as CDU treasurer, quite clearly was one of "transmission" there.

Kiep: I made efforts very early--since the early seventies--to reach agreement among the Bundestag parties about a reform of legislation. I initiated a demarche to Karlsruhe with a view to clarification of at least a number of important points. I made the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court the basis of new talks, but that too failed.

SPIEDEL: In other words, it is the others who are to be blamed for the affairs?

Kiep: The parties as a whole showed themselves to be weak in that they were unable to do something. We in the CDU at least undertook something.

SPIEGEL: The worst attempt to repair something occurred when the three leaders of the party deputies in the Bundestag wanted to bring about a general amnesty of all those involved in the donation affairs.

Kiep: The idea of a retroactive measure is an utter impossibility in a country governed by the rule of law, with everyone being equal before the law. As for the future, one must consider the question of how the parties appropriately can procure funds. The recommendations of the commission appointed by the Federal president are sure to provide a handle for this in the next few months.

I believe that the damage which has occurred can be offset by greater transparency in the funding of parties. For instance, the parties should be compelled to make public not only their income but also their expenditures.

SPIEGEL: Do you hope that by scolding the parties in general and by calling on the CDU to open up a little you will catch another few votes on the fringe of the Green scene? To wear green is very fashionable these days.

Kiep: We have no reason at all to take over the objectives of the Greens. I respect the 7.7 percent of votes obtained by the Greens in Hamburg. That is a democratic decision which must be taken seriously.

I do not respect GAL, because that political grouping does not have any proposals of solutions which help to implement their long-term aims, interesting though there are.

There is no way for us to come closer to the Greens as far as their objectives are concerned.

To that extent, therefore, I want no opening up toward those ideas but only an opening up in the direction of a greater understanding for voters and people who in light of the overall situation are wondering how things can go on like this. To reply to this in comprehensible language--that is our task.

SPIEGEL: That sounds quite different from what Dregger is proposing--for the established parties to stand together against the Greens in defense and offense.

Kiep: He made a proposal with a view to preventing a situation where it is impossible to form a government. He probably had the example of Hamburg in mind. It is my aim too to prevent the Greens from gaining influence on Hamburg politics. How this can be accomplished is another question.

Dregger on Green Party

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 19 Jul 82 pp 32-33

[Interview with Hesse CDU Chairman Alfred Dregger: "'Quitting Reality'"]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Dregger, you are calling for an agreement between all Bundestag parties designed to insure the formation of a government without the participation of the Greens and Alternatives. Is it your purpose to neutralize the newcomers in the parliaments?

Dregger: Putting the Greens under quarantine is not what I am out to do. It is not I who am excluding the Greens from the formation of governments; they are doing so themselves.

SPIEGEL: The Basic Law states that the parties participate "in forming the people's political will." There is no mention of any obligation to participate in the government.

Dregger: No obligation, it is true, but there is such a thing as responsibility in the parliamentary system. We must not make ourselves the prisoner of a political grouping which in any case has not yet completely entered the democratic system.

SPIEGEL: How do you think the country should be governed without the Greens?

Dregger: I happened to be living in Canada when the conservative party there scored a big election victory without attaining an absolute majority. There were no Greens and no extremists. Solely for the sake of democratic fairness, the losers in the election asked some of their party friends not to take part in the vote to elect a prime minister. They thus made sure that the winner also formed the government. The winner in the Hamburg election is Kiep, and in accordance with the Canadian idea of fairness he also ought to govern.

SPIEGEL: The example is farfetched.

Dregger: Maybe so, but it would suit us very well. It is a way of insuring that our parliamentary system does not become incapable of functioning. If you take Hamburg, a grand coalition between the CDU and SPD would be a bad thing because there would then be no strong democratic opposition any longer. And therefore, for the time in which the Greens are excluding themselves from the responsibility of government, agreements have to be reached between the democratic parties to insure that the system remains capable of functioning. And that means, reasonably, that the strongest party governs and the second-strongest is in opposition.

SPIEGEL: How is this supported to be accomplished if arithmetically the SPD and the Greens have a majority. Are SPD deputies to call in sick or to make it a point to leave the assembly hall?

Dregger: That really is not necessary. One simply stays back of the door-- something not unusual in parliamentary life.

SPIEGEL: Is your model to take effect only at the election of a government or also in ensuing votes about issues?

Dregger: Only at the election of a government.

SPIEGEL: Accordingly the CDU minority government would be toppled at the first opportunity, which surely makes no sense.

Dregger: As long as the Greens exclude themselves from government responsibility, it would be indefensible for the democratic opposition to cooperate in that way with the Greens since that would make Hamburg ungovernable.

SPIEGEL: At the turn of the year you still gave assurances that you would be "fair to the deputies of the Greens in everyday parliamentary work," that the CDU would refuse "to be included in a united front of the so-called established parties against the new competition." And now?

Dregger: I do not want to band together with the other parties against the Greens. I also refuse to fight the Greens just because they are new. I adopted a far more moderate attitude toward them than did anyone else. I do not want to exclude them. They are no extremists, they are no Nazis, and apart from the few they are no communists.

SPIEGEL: So what is it you want?

Dregger: What is crucial as far as I am concerned is, as long as their learning process has not developed to democratic maturity, not to let our system founder on the fact that they do not allow themselves to be integrated.

SPIEGEL: You reproach the Greens for not adjusting to the parliamentary system. Is it not precisely you who are violating the democratic rules with your proposal?

Dregger: I do not reproach them for anything at all; I only note that they themselves refuse to participate in the government. This means that a foreign body has entered the parliamentary system which, however, need not ruin democracy.

SPIEGEL: Will the agreement you intend to reach with the other Bundestag parties not eliminate the elected representatives of a large number of citizens-- in some regions something like 8 percent?

Dregger: No. All I am doing is to draw the conclusion from the Greens' autonomous decision that they themselves do not want to bear any government responsibility. When this premise no longer exists, my proposal is void.

SPIEGEL: If the Greens do not adapt, do you think they will be something like enemies of the constitution?

Dregger: Not at all. They are supporters of a conservative Utopia with a very important concern I share--to protect nature and landscape. I am as fond of nature as of art, but I also want the chimney to give off steam. If someone wants to create jobs for 1.5 million people, he also has to want growth.

SPIEGEL: The SPD thinks that barring the Greens amounts to "forming a cartel against new groupings as if they were, a priori, enemies of the democratic state of the rule of law."

Dregger: That is a stupid slogan of course. The FDP has definitely understood me; the SPD does not want to understand me because it wants to join with the Greens. Surely what Mr Dohnanyi is performing in Hamburg is a tragedy. Before the election he said that he was not acquainted with the Greens at all, and now he is so well acquainted with them that, as the loser in the election and as chairman of the second-strongest party, he wants to remain in power with their aid...

SPIEGEL: ...just as the CDU, according to its ideas, is to come to power with the help of the comrades [the SPD].

Dregger: As the strongest party. But please let me go on. I am sure that the SPD will behave in Bonn and in Hesse exactly the same way as the SPD in Hamburg did.

SPIEGEL: In Hesse the Greens refused categorically to work together with an SPD under Minister-President Boerner.

Dregger: If the Hesse SPD has to sacrifice Mr Boerner, it will sacrifice him. They would like to be rid of him anyway.

SPIEGEL: The comrades in Hesse know that their top candidate is some points ahead of the party as far as support by the electorate is concerned.

Dregger: If he does procure the votes, this will be forgotten for the sake of gaining power.

SPIEGEL: Are you already engaging in an election campaign?

Dregger: I just want things to be clear before the election. The SPD should not lie; it should say what it really wants.

SPIEGEL: In other words, your proposal of an agreement by all parties represented in the Bundestag aims at exposing the SPD?

SPIEGEL: The SPD surely has already bared itself--in Hamburg.

SPIEGEL: Your move permits one to suppose that the Greens in Hesse are messing up your scheme by proceeding together with the SPD.

Dregger: One minute! I am not so bold or arrogant as to say that I already have an absolute majority in the bag.

SPIEGEL: Would you ever make an offer to the Greens to take part in a government?

Dregger: That's impossible, for I don't just want the partial truth of protection of the environment but the whole truth, of which full employment is a part. The Greens represent the high point of quitting reality which began with the SPD and partly also the FDP in the seventies. It is the task of the CDU to initiate a return to reality so that in a small country, poor in raw materials, we can make it possible for everyone to be well off while protecting nature and the landscape, which can be done only if a strong economy provides the funds.

8790

CSO: 3103/583

PCP-PCI: CONTRASTS, PARADOXES, PROBLEMS EXAMINED

Paris ETUDES in French Jun 82 pp 757-768

[Article by Georges Lavau: "The Communist Parties in France and Italy"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Although the classic exercise for novice political analysts--"compare the Italian Communist Party and the French Communist Party"--is totally lacking in originality, it does offer one advantage: the opportunity to have a useful review of the problems and paradoxes of the "great" European communist parties in a context of political competition.

I. Paradoxes, Asymmetries, Difficulties

One is in the government and the other is not. One appears to be striving to divorce itself as much as possible from its image as a traditional communist-Leninist party: this is the one which is not associated with any governmental responsibilities. The other one, on the contrary, appears to be committed to a reaffirmation of its identity as a party that is loyal to the remnant of the international communist movement grouped around the USSR; this is the one which holds posts in a government directed by one of the principal parties of the Socialist International.

The one that is /excluded/ from the central government--the Italian Communist Party--obtained 31 percent of the total vote cast in the 1979 elections, and 34 percent in those of June 1976. The one that is part of the parliamentary majority and sits on the governmental councils--the French Communist Party--represents about half the electoral strength of the PCI: 15.5 percent of the total vote cast on 26 April 1981, 16.1 percent on 14 June, and 15.8 percent in the cantonal elections of March 1982. Since 1976, in any case, the Italian governments have been based only on very narrow, heterogeneous and fragile majorities, due largely (but not exclusively) to the difficult alliance between the Christian Democratic and Socialist parties--a circumstance which perpetuates (in the absence of constitutional reform on a major scale, something which is not likely to occur) the concept of a "grand coalition" which would in one fashion or another include the PCI but would at best be only a temporary solution and could confuse the political picture even further. Implementation of this concept was initially attempted in 1978 (with ambiguous results), but the PSI and DC--who had agreed to make this attempt at least--soon denounced it, long before the PCI itself formally rejected it on

27 November 1980. In France, where the Socialist Party by itself holds an absolute majority in the National Assembly and its leader was elected to the Presidency of the Republic for a term of 7 years, the participation of the communist ministers was not a response to any parliamentary necessity. It is a good bet that at least until the 1983 municipal elections--or until a hypothetical failure of the socialist "experiment" or an even more hypothetical split in the Socialist Party--the communist deputies could find it difficult to vote en bloc against the government's proposals: in other words, it is a good bet that the PCF and the CGT would evaluate somewhat carefully the risk they would be taking if they were to denounce government policy too systematically. The PCI, on the other hand, continues to be excluded from power, as if it were not "worthy to govern," despite the fact that it is at least giving its support to the general orientations of an anti-inflationary policy; despite the fact that stands foursquare in support of the fight against terrorism; and despite the fact that in the area of foreign policy its "line" is scarcely different from that of the government parties: for example, it supports the Community-wide policies of the EEC; has unequivocally denounced the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the establishment of the state of siege in Poland; does not give unconditional support to the Soviet positions on arms limitation; and lastly, maintains good relations with the German, Austrian, Spanish, Portuguese and French socialists. In France, on the other hand, the PCF makes no attempt--despite its association with the government--to conceal its differences with its Socialist partners concerning the issues of Afghanistan and Poland or concerning the installation of NATO missiles on European territory, and it has voiced its disagreement with certain legislative and governmental measures. If someone from a foreign country were to come here and read, in succession, L'UNITA and L'HUMANITE and then RINASCITA and REVOLUTION, he would have some difficulty fathoming which of the two--the PCF or the PCI--is in the government and which is in the opposition.

The contrasts and the paradoxes do not stop there.

When, in 1977 and 1978, the Italian communist leaders adopted an extremely tolerant attitude toward the Christian Democratic governments in furtherance of their policy of "historic compromise," they came under strong criticism not only from a part of their own leadership but even more so from the party rank and file, who believe the only "natural" alliance is with the PSI and that the DC is its permanent adversary.¹ There is little doubt that the return of the party to the opposition in early 1979 was in accordance with the desires of the party members, many of whom continue to disapprove of their leaders' denunciations of the USSR and the other "socialist" countries. The situation in the case of the PCF is almost the reverse--up to a certain point/. From October 1974 (the 21st Congress) until 27 April 1981 it was primarily the PCF leadership that was willing to strain relations with the socialist ally to the breaking point and accordingly run the risk of depriving the voters of the Left of the possibility of a victory in 1978 and again in 1981. By its actions it caused confusion among a part of PCF supporters and members of the PCF (most of whom had placed a reasoned faith in the dynamics of unity), and this confusion was translated into votes for the PS by the supporters, beginning in the first round, and into a withdrawal from party activities by the members. The situation seems to have turned around

since the signing of the 23 June 1981 agreement between the PCF and PS and since the entry of the four communist ministers into the Mauroy administration: today, it is this participation, from a position of weakness and subordination (which the party leaders have "explained" with far less success than they formerly had "explained" why you couldn't trust the socialists) that appears to have aroused feelings of incomprehension and anxiety on the part of some PCF members.

In one respect the two parties find themselves in a relatively similar situation: in each party the members are fewer in number and cannot be mobilized at will as easily as before (the PCI, for its part, acknowledges this fact and does not conceal the decline in its membership, at least in the South).² Moreover, they often do not understand very well the strategies of their respective leaderships,³ and sometimes remain aloof--or mobilize without enthusiasm--when asked to carry out certain policy "lines" they deem to be somewhat unclear.

This extremely hasty overview is obviously insufficient, and should therefore be rounded out by a more detailed examination of certain aspects of those situations that are characteristic of each of the two parties.

II. The French Communist Party Enters the Government, but Without Chains: It Remains Communist First and Foremost

For many reasons, it was virtually impossible for the PCF to decline Francois Mitterrand's offer to participate in the government. The only problem was how to avoid having to pay too high a price for that "participation-miracle" and avoid the danger of being restricted or relegated to the background.

The joint declaration signed 23 June 1981 by the PS and PCF might--on first reading--give the impression that the PCF had tied its own hands (and indeed, many communists must have at that time regarded the declaration as a capitulation). A careful reading shows that contrary to appearances, the terms of the declaration are in fact not constrictive and leave escape hatches for the communists.⁴ Another price that has to be paid is the necessary governmental solidarity--the obligation on the part of the communist ministers to respect all the prerogatives of the president and the prime minister. It is a price that can be paid with relative ease, as we shall see. An infinitely more serious (although not immediate) danger is that future failures, delays and disappointments will reflect on a PCF that is tied to the government, and on a membership that is immobilized by respect and deference (although this situation could remain unresolved for a long time, for there will also be advantages and "victories"). The danger is that the PCF--and with it the CGT--will be accused of "taking it on faith" and of having restrained the struggles. It was quite obvious that the PCF would try hard to ward off this danger.

Very simple in principle, but more difficult to put into practice in a given specific circumstance, the strategy for parrying this threat is based on a division of labor. The communist ministers are irreproachable with respect to governmental collegiality and solidarity: they are discreet and hard-working and show only by an occasional, well-chosen "thrust" that they remain

communist party members. The parliamentary groups are exercising with discrimination their right to criticize and make proposals, and are able even to cast an occasional hostile vote without any consequences. The network of party organizations, and the communist press, are in charge of doling out the testimonials of satisfaction, the suggestions, the regrets and the criticism. Lastly, and as the main theme of this strategy, the OGT (all of whose "rebel cadres" have been shunted aside)⁵ is in the forefront of a struggle for selected objectives: a struggle against management and against unresponsive civil servants, to be sure, but also against all those who are impeding or delaying the "change."⁶

The objective of this strategy is first and foremost to place the party simultaneously /on/ the government's side and /by/ the government's side. It was accordingly the only strategy that would enable the party to attempt to solve a dual problem: that of disguising its abrupt break with a recent past of anti-PS denunciation while responding to the concern of certain party members who fear that participation in the government is a fatal fraud.

Since the meeting of the Central Committee on 25-26 June 1981 followed by the 24th Congress in February 1982 and until the present moment, the Communist Party leadership has not "corrected" any of its previous positions that were taken since 1972. Conceding only that because of the anticommunist campaigns it has sometimes been "misunderstood," the party leadership has reiterated incessantly that it had been "right"--right in warning the workers against the "turn to the right" on the part of the socialists; right in heightening the tension in the days leading up to 26 April 1981; right at Vitry-sur-Seine; right at Montigny-les-Cormeilles; right in approving the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; right in evaluating the "balance sheet" of the so-called socialist countries as "generally positive";⁷ right in imparting a correspondingly harsh tone to the presidential campaign of Georges Marchais; and lastly, right in not associating itself with the protests against the establishment of the state of siege in Poland and against the dissolution of Solidarnosc. Although the party nonetheless ultimately joined the socialist majority, it was solely out of respect for the people's will; for since the majority of the French people desired /that kind/ of change under the direction of /that/ party (despite the warnings by the PCF), the communists have to associate themselves with that desire for change merely in order to give their party a better chance (perhaps its only chance?) of not being abandoned. Everything is taking place as if the interminable thesis of the anti-PS anathema has simply been carefully wrapped and placed in deep storage for future use at a propitious moment; for the party faithful know better than anyone else that no bridges have been burned behind them. The thesis of "justification and confirmation" is designed to show that despite its metamorphosis into a governmental party, the PCF remains the PCF; in other words, it is /first and foremost/ a party that is not complaisant vis-a-vis the socialists and has no intention of turning the "leadership role" over to them or sharing it with them.

This PCF participation in the government is, however, a participation of such modest proportions, was granted with such a disagreeable attitude of noblesse oblige, and was so obviously intended not only to demonstrate socialist good

faith but also--if the opportunity arises--to give a measure of power to the CGT! It is obvious that despite the "on again-off again" policy of commitment practiced for 10 months by the PCF, a part of the PCF membership and cadres finds it difficult to accept the principle and, above all, the conditions. Some of their number say that if their party leaders had not created the conditions for such an electoral reverse and had not thereafter made such an abrupt and dizzying change of direction, the participation of the PCF would be presented under more favorable and "dignified" conditions. Others say it would have been better to leave to the Socialist Party (with its big majority) the burden of a difficult task, with the PCF holding itself in readiness--at the proper moment--either to exploit the failure and/or renunciation of the socialists or to sell its support (which would at last have become indispensable) at the best possible price.

Within the apparatus, signs of strong resistance to the decisions of the leadership are not lacking. In his report to the Central Committee on 25-26 June 1981 and also in the report he presented to the 24th Congress, Georges Marchais was very discreet concerning the "victory" represented by the presence of four communists in the cabinet (at the congress it was Charles Fiterman, speaking much more as a cabinet minister than as a member of the party leadership, who praised this participation). Moreover, Marchais cleverly acknowledged this resistance in addressing a meeting of cell secretaries and members of the section bureaus of the Paris federation on 20 April 1982. Admitting that within the party there are "questions" and a "lack of understanding," he declared: "Are there some communists, perhaps, who think that it would now be advisable to step aside? Or even that we should not retain our role...as part of the majority and the government?"⁸

The secretary general's response to these "interrogations" was sharp in tone, but underneath it sounded somewhat like a speech by a defense counsel:

"It would be completely erroneous to interpret our commitment...as submission to circumstances that would outstrip us and that could cause us gradually to lose our identity as a revolutionary party.... What is important now is not to put on airs but to show ourselves to be offense-minded and victory-oriented..., to prove to everyone that when it comes to making forward progress, the communists are indeed...the best."⁹

"The best." Georges Marchais is obviously, by his statement, touching a sensitive chord; but the PCF has risked so much for so long, in the service of so many slogans--one after the other--which in recent years have yielded such paltry results! According to a great deal of concordant testimony, very few rank and file party members during the election campaigns of 1981 and 1982 lined up with the "permanent" party members in support of the communist candidates. And in an entirely different domain, despite the frequent and insistent appeals for a "people's mobilization" against the installation of American Euromissiles in Europe, the level of effort by the party members remains at a very low level.

There is every reason to believe that the communist leaders were voicing their basic convictions when--on various occasions in recent months--they

reiterated that they are in no way planning to end their participation in the government: neither the party nor the CGT can, in fact, hope for anything better than the present government--probably for a long time to come. The only difficulty is that their rank and file supporters are even more aware of this fact than they themselves are--a circumstance that benefits the PS most of all. This is also why there is every reason to believe that the PCF (and the CGT even more so) will increasingly be aggressive and critical participants. Lastly, there is every reason to believe that neither the president nor the Socialist Party foresees a time when it would be advisable to dispense with communist cooperation. This is true, moreover, despite the fact that the mediocre results for the PS in the recent cantonal elections would seem to indicate that a part of the 1981 socialist electorate was rebelling against the communist presence in the government (just as these elections also indicated a certain indifference on the part of the communist voters).

The French Communist Party has reason to believe that based on these positions of cautious and prudent management of the situations resulting from these contradictions, it will stabilize its relative decline within the near future.

The most fundamental problems remain unsolved, however. We shall limit ourselves here to only two of these problems, as follows: What does the PCF propose to do concerning the economic crisis? What are its positions on foreign policy, and will it persist in tying its strategy to that of the Soviet Union?

Everything that has been said above concerning the strategy of the PCF and CGT shows that they are continuing (even though the communist ministers say nothing about this publicly) to believe that their main responsibility is still to /make demands/, to reject austerity, to discard every "social contract" type of action, and never to become--in any way, shape or form--responsible for "managing the crisis." Despite the fact that they have been placed in positions of responsibility, this crisis remains alien to them--as if it were an evil resulting from capitalism, one in which they had played no part, just as they had played no part in the inflation, in the health insurance deficit, or in the difficulties of the enterprises. Although it is admitted that the national solidarity effort has, to date, demanded more sacrifices from the social classes of lowest income (and with great disparities even within these groups), the fact remains that the crisis is merely a problem of redistribution; the treatment will take a long time; and the remedies and cure will require a coherent policy, discipline, and constraints from which no social category can be exempt. The PCF and CGT are careful not to reject this scenario wholesale: they reject only individual details, one at a time. What is most serious of all, they refrain from making any comprehensive statement of a positive nature that would acknowledge the nature and extent of the crisis and that would propose an economic policy encompassing all existing problems without subterfuge or evasion: the problems relating to workers' rights, working conditions, and the division of labor as well as vocational adaptability and mobility and the problems relating to the enterprises, investments, production costs, world trade, our arms sales, and so forth.¹⁰

This kind of abstention is not acceptable behavior on the part of a "great" party: and in the last analysis, is it even profitable? It perpetuates the image of a party that performs the role of an advocate--nothing more. The PCF does not take sufficiently into consideration the fact that a part of the "workers" to whom it appeals are themselves quite aware that the crisis (of which they are the chief victims) will not be solved solely by "victories wrested" from management and by the rate of increase in the number of jobs held by CGT members. One final disadvantage (to which the communists obviously pay no heed): the abstentionism of the PCF is not causing the PS to leave its entrenched positions, with the sole result that the PS is all too strongly motivated to leave to a handful of experts the task of developing--by themselves--an economic policy to which it could give its cautious support.¹¹

The PCF clearly does not intend to take upon itself the full burden of a governmental responsibility. And perhaps it is not intellectually prepared to do so: for too long it has labored toward a single objective, namely to win the "premier influence" over the "working class."

I wrote, in July 1981, that the one thing most likely to cause the PCF to cease its participation in the government would be for the latter to carry out a foreign policy that is overtly contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union.¹²

Such a circumstance does not now appear to be possible in the foreseeable future. First of all, because (as the events in Poland have demonstrated) the president and the government are tolerating the expression--by the Communist Party--of overt differences of opinion on matters of major importance. Secondly, because it is in no way certain that under these circumstances the USSR would need to have the PCF go so far as to break with the PS. And lastly, because from all indications no aspect of French foreign policy to date--in terms of North-South relations, the East-West dispute, or European policy--is really unacceptable to the French communists, at least so long as they are allowed to dissociate themselves, without risk, from whatever does not please them.

The socialist leaders, moreover, are perhaps not displeased by the fact that the PCF is persisting in its "global" defense of "real socialism" and in its total support of the Soviet causes. The PCF has, in fact, been so isolated in its positions on Afghanistan and Poland (and this has caused so much difficulty in its ranks) that one may well speculate concerning the harm that this obstinacy will continue to cause the party. This argument may well be correct, but it will probably not dissuade the PCF from the choice it made in 1979, namely the decision to support the international class struggle--led by the Soviet Union--which according to the PCF's analyses is benefiting from the new relationship of the forces in the world; the intensification of the national liberation struggles; and European neoneutralism.¹³ There is no indication that this decision--whatever the cost in terms of domestic isolation--will soon be reversed. The PCF is accordingly not attempting to improve its image abroad, believing that it is more important for the party to remain first and foremost a /true/ communist party. Its only chance to

avoid suffering excessively from this image is embodied in the errors of Western diplomacy, the forgetfulness of public opinion, and the partial security which the leftist currents of the European social democratic parties can provide it.

III. The PCI: "Step Outside of Communism, So That the Communists Will Be Recognized"

Even when, in 1978, their party appeared to be "authorized" by the DC to support an experiment in national reform, the Italian communist leaders probably had no illusions regarding the distance that remains to be covered before they achieve full "recognition."

Nor are they unaware of the cleavages, and differences in sensitivity, that exist among their various constituencies (varying according to regions, generations and professional strata); among their supporters and party members; and within the "leadership group." These differences result from the juxtaposition of an older "veteran communist" culture--especially in rural areas and in those regions where the adherents (many of whom are elderly) of a minority PCI have for more than 20 years been fighting the Christian Democratic patronage system--on the one hand, and a new culture (characteristic of the younger generations) that is quite critical of the socialist countries and does not employ the traditional communist vocabulary. They know that election gains are frequently offset by a decline in recruitment; that supporters and party members have grown older, with the result that communications are often inadequate between them and the party "functionaries," who are frequently very young and chosen for their high intellectual level but are often lacking in experience in the "struggle for territory";¹⁴ and that it is often difficult to interest the general electorate in foreign policy discussions (which is, however, a favorite subject of the PCI leadership).¹⁵

Despite all these obstacles, the PCI has made a decision which--particularly in the situation wherein it finds itself--is not without risk, namely the decision to function within the opposition as a "government party" that refuses to take refuge in categorical defenses and that has discarded the old binary model of a guilty imperialism and a socialism that is above suspicion.

On the first point, one must of necessity be brief. Instead of demanding new nationalizations, the PCI recently advocated an austerity policy of a certain kind; it has been, and to the best of my knowledge remains, an advocate of an income policy; and it has been able to see the dangers inherent in the wage escalators. It is opposed to corporatism. Its economic proposals take fully into account the problems of unemployment, the immigrants from the South, the young people, and the "underprivileged." It is, generally speaking, able to withstand the temptation to exploit certain national dramas (for example, the administrative shortcomings revealed by the earthquake that devastated the Naples region). It understands that Italians can be irritated by its inveterately pedagogical manner. It is also possible that a closer examination would reveal some instances of temporizing behavior. It is also undoubtedly true that now that it is confined within a hopeless opposition, the PCI is not advancing the same thesis that it did in 1975-1978. Perhaps

the party could also be criticized for resolving its difficulties in a somewhat too "magical" a manner, by turning for solutions to the enchanted circle of European policies that are more planning-oriented and better coordinated.

Despite all these reservations, the policy as designed is characterized both by reasonable ambition and by a certain political courage (this is, moreover, precisely what worries all those who--in all social strata--have felt reassured by the policy of accommodation practiced by the DC).

According to the belated testimony of Paolo Buffalini, in April 1979 (and therefore before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan) the PCI became alarmed when it saw the USSR substituting military intervention (sometimes by interposing Cuban or Vietnamese allies) for the autonomous action of revolutionary and national liberation movements.¹⁶

In any event, it was the intervention in Afghanistan (which the old-line leader Giorgio Amendola refused to denounce) that provoked, on the part of the PCI, a condemnation of Soviet foreign policy that was both categorical and general. The party opined that the USSR was becoming--just as much as the United States--"an active contributor to the crisis of detente (as a result of) its direct or indirect intervention in various parts of the world."¹⁷ The PCI continues to be one of the champions of "detente," but detente as it was practiced in the time of SALT-1 and Helsinki, not the detente that allowed military intervention for the purpose of aiding the revolutionary movements. Rather than apply the concept of "imperialism" equally to the USSR and the USA, however, the PCI substituted the concepts of "power politics" and "militarization." The party leaders will accordingly base the struggle for peace and detente more than ever not on the "socialist countries" but on Europe and, within Europe, on the "European Left" (whose authority will depend primarily on the "recomposition" of the labor movement as a whole), and also on the movement of the nonaligned countries (provided that the movement keeps itself free from Soviet and Cuban influence).

In the fall of 1980 the Italian communist leaders appear to have foreseen the disastrous outcome of the situation in Poland.¹⁸ When that event occurred their condemnation was accordingly categorical, and it was reaffirmed following the indignant rejoinder by the Soviet press. The lengthy statement published on 30 December 1981 by the PCI leadership sounded like a farewell to "real socialism":

"The fact is that in the countries of the East one finds oneself, now and henceforth, in the presence of complex processes, of recurrent and dramatic crises which call into question the monolithic conception of power; the absence of institutions that are truly representative of the interrelationships of society; and the restricted and hierarchical conception of internal relationships within the "socialist bloc".... All this results not only in a disregard for the human freedoms and for creative energies but has the effect of restraining the economic, technological and cultural dynamism of these societies.... One must take cognizance of the fact that the developmental phase of socialism which began with the October Revolution has exhausted its propulsive force."¹⁹

This statement was an indictment of "the negative influence of the USSR" in the Polish crisis; it identified the underlying origin of this evil as the authoritarian imposition of this model--and the Soviet protectorate--in the people's democracies.

A discussion²⁰ published in RINASCITA (8 January 1982) candidly posed the problem of the "reformability" of "real socialism": none of the participants argued that it was capable of self-reform. In the course of still another discussion, the historian Paolo Spriano acknowledged that it was indeed the Afghanistan episode that had motivated the PCI to make such a drastic condemnation, adding that the crisis in Poland had "assumed immoderate dimensions."²¹

The PCI may accordingly have run the risk of intensifying the reservations of the older segment of its supporters,²² without thereby appeasing its Christian Democratic, socialist, and revolutionary Far Right adversaries. Perhaps it will not win on any level. Perhaps it will have succeeded only in improving still further its image abroad--something which is of little value to it in Italy.

Perhaps the PCI would be more "at home"...in France.

FOOTNOTES

1. See the two excellent articles--based on surveys made among PCI members--by Marzio Barbagli and Piergiorgio Scorbetta: "One Tactic and Two Strategies," IL MULINO, No 260, Nov-Dec 1978, and "The Turnaround of the PCI," IL MULINO, No 273, Jan 1981.
2. See especially a series of articles appearing in RINASCITA, 12 Feb 1982, pp 11-12, concerning the difficulties of the party sections and--in particular--a close analysis by Pio La Torre (who was murdered on 30 April).
3. This difficulty that the party members have in understanding the strategies of the communist parties has persisted throughout their entire history. Today, however, there is a steady decline in the number of party members who--even though they do not understand--will nevertheless unfailingly carry out the party "tasks" (albeit sometimes with a heavy heart).
4. The two parties pledged "to promote the new politics, which has chosen the Frenchwomen and Frenchmen...for the National Assembly...and government, ...in the local and regional collectivities, and in the enterprises...." This enumeration would appear to leave little room for the PCF to operate. "Unfailing solidarity," however, is demanded only of the members of the government. Moreover, the two signatories "reaffirm their commitment to the individual personality and /basic positions/ of their respective parties." As for the international issues, none that might

divide the two parties was overlooked, but the formulation of the commitments was couched in such imprecise terms that it can always allow for differing interpretations--a result that was probably intentional on the part of the two signatories (see complete text in *CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME*, 1981, special number: "Elections legislatives 1981" [Legislative Elections of 1981], pp 40-41).

5. Of those members of the Executive Committee who have voiced their disagreement with the "line" of the central organization, the following may be mentioned: Christiane Gilles, Jean-Louis Moynot, Roger Rousselot (all three of whom are communists), Rene Buhl, Pierre Feuilly, and Jacqueline Lambert. The disagreements are manifested not only within CGT circles but also within certain federations and within regional and departmental unions.
6. The PCF has expressed particular opposition to the reestablishment of assessments on wage earners for Social Security; to wage reductions offsetting the reduction in hours of work; to the "gift of 18 billion" to management; to the reform of the audio-visual services; and to the government's plans concerning assistance to private education.
7. The expression, "generally positive balance sheet," was not textually restated in the resolution adopted by the 24th Congress, but its content was totally retained.
8. *L'HUMANITE*, 21 April 1982.
9. *Ibid.*
10. One of the rare fields in which the PCF has made an arguable but consistent choice is that of energy policy, wherein it gave priority to nuclear power.
11. Only the CFTD [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] is attempting to require that the government establish a policy that is both general, consistent and innovative.
12. See "The Decline of the PCF: Is It a Sudden Turn of Fortune or an Historic Process of Decay?", *LE DEBAT*, No 16, November 1981.
13. For further developments, see Chapter 9 of my book, "A quoi sert le Parti communiste francais?" [Of What Use Is the French Communist Party?], Fayard, 1981, and my contribution to the collective book edited by Lilly Marcou, "L'URSS vue de gauche" [The USSR Viewed From the Left], PUF [French University Press], 1982.
14. See in *RINASCITA*, 12 March 1982, the articles by Roberto Speciale and d'Evelino Abeni.
15. See the article, "To Talk About Danzig in Turin," *RINASCITA*, 16 February 1982.

16. L'UNITA, 9 April 1981. See Jean Rony, contribution to Lilly Marcou, "L'URSS Vue de Gauche," p 224.
17. Quoted by J. Rony, *ibid.*
18. J. Rony, *op. cit.*, p 225.
19. Text in extenso in RINASCITA, 8 January 1982.
20. Discussion among five communist leaders: Giuseppe Boffa, Cesare Luporini, Giancarlo Pajetta, Adriana Sereni, and Bruno Trentin. Trentin was the most lucid of the five. According to him, nothing can be expected from a policy based on gradual progress and imperceptible self-correction: nothing can be done without qualitative changes and without a genuine "break" that will necessitate a form of progress which leaves behind state-controlled formulas for management of the economy and human resources..., a massive contribution of freedom, the introduction of disputation and pluralism into the system." *Loc. cit.*, p 14.
21. RINASCITA, 12 February 1982, p 23.
22. The opposition of Armando Cossutta, centered around a press organ, does not at present appear likely to cause much havoc within the ranks of the PCI. It could, however, have the effect of forcing the PCI to state its positions more precisely, to depart from its rhetorical soliloquy.

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CSO: 3100/754

KARAMANLIS, PAPANDREOU RELATIONS ALLEGEDLY STRAINED

Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 19 Jun 82 pp 1, 6

[Excerpts] A government spokesman was asked whether discrepancies noted between remarks made in speeches by the president of the republic and the government policy indicate there are problems in the relations between the president and the prime minister. The government spokesman answered: "It is common knowledge that there is harmony in the cooperation between the president of the republic and the government on all issues."

Political observers were surprised and intrigued yesterday following the statement by the government spokesman. This, because:

1. The government appears now to be aligned with positions it had been denouncing daily when it was in the opposition; subsequently, as government and as PASOK it had called for "more democratization in the armed forces." The observers also pointed to the recent transfer of more than 20 officers from the training center at Korinthos. This, besides the retirements, transfers and proscription of others.
2. The erosion of the armed forces is taking place with the tolerance and often under the guidance of the government. There are many examples, the observers said, leading to these conclusions. They include: the communist manifestation at the KEVOP [Infantry Heavy Weapons Training Center] Camp, that took place with the permission of Deputy Defense Minister Andr. Drosogiannis.
3. As a party, PASOK continues its tactics against the armed forces; they are not clear and are completely opposite of those the Papandreou government appears to be believing.

These and other events, said the observers, lead to some crucial questions about the relations and the "alignment" between government and the president of the republic. Mr Karamanlis yesterday publicly referred to the question of protecting the armed forces. This means that in substance there is such an issue and that until now it has not been faced by the Papandreou government.

Finally, the statement by the government spokesman appeared to represent an attempt to cover up the issue.

Present at the commencement exercises were President of Parliament Io. Alevras, Minister of Finance M. Dretakis, Minister of Education El. Veryvakis, Deputy Minister of National Defense Ant. Drosogiannis, parliamentarians, and the leadership of the armed and security forces, led by Admiral Degiannis, chief of GEETHA [National Defense General Staff].

Immediately after his speech, the president of the republic handed out the diplomas to 56 graduating officers and higher state officials.

An earlier speaker, Rear Admiral Zografakis, commander of the National Defense School, referred to the mission and the goals of the institution he is leading.

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CSO: 4621/407

POLICE OFFICERS TO BE PROMOTED

Athens ELEVTHREROS KOSMOS in Greek 19 Jun 82 p 8

[Text] The Council for the Evaluation of Higher Officers of the City Police Force, is scheduled to meet today under the chairmanship of the chief of the city police. It will decide on promotions of police chiefs first class who have completed their years for promotion. The council will chose two among them to be promoted to the rank of police director general, to fill two vacancies.

Press reports say the promotion of the most senior police chief first class, Kyr. Mikheloudakis, should be expected. He is now commander of the Police Officers' School. A strong candidate for the second opening of police director general is the current chief of Athens Traffic Police, Andr. Matsangas; the promotion of other more senior officers, however, should not be precluded. These senior officers include: I. Kondogiannis, Th. Dimitriou, and S. Alexopoulos.

The same press reports do not preclude that the issue of leadership in the city police might come up by the end of June. In that case, current Chief Ioan. Nitsos would be succeeded by the current first deputy chief, Panag. Raftopoulos, who will be replaced by the current second deputy chief, D. Papasotiriou; the position of the latter would be taken by the current director of the Piraeus Police, Georg. Sambanis, who will be promoted to deputy chief. Another promotion to the rank of police chief first class will follow; the person involved will be promoted to police director general.

The positions of police chiefs first class that are to become vacant following the above stated changes will be filled by the first in line among the police chiefs second class: Nik. Katsareas, Khr. Panagopoulos, G. Kouteris, G. Gondas and others.

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CSO: 4621/407

BRIEFS

MUNICIPAL ELECTION LAW CRITICISM--The Movement of Greek Reformists has issued the following statement: "The new election law being prepared by the PASOK government repeats the old story: the antidemocratic election system that had been carried out by ND is now being replaced by an election rigging system which is in substance equally antidemocratic. Minority groupings were not given anything under the old law; now, they are being given crumbs. The application of democratic principles, however, is not a quantitative subject. Democracy has an absolute meaning and is not given by installments. It is a question of substance and in this case it means that the simple proportional representation election system should be carried out; that system would give to each grouping a proportion of seats equal to the proportion of the votes it has received. If it is increased to some extent, the system will be in substance antidemocratic because it will be altering the people's will. Therefore, the psuedodemocratic party of PASOK should leave hypocrisies aside and should acknowledge openly that with the new antidemocratic law it will be trying to take over the country's municipalities and communities, so that it can carry out its policies. Our party which will have its own candidates throughout the country, completely opposes the proposed election system and will react to it within the framework of its own forces." [Text] [Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 20 Jun 82 p 3] 8193

CSO: 4621/407

RECENT BOOKS REVEAL MORE OF MAOIST PARTY'S IDEOLOGY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Jul 82 p 3

[Article by Terje Svabo: "Ogrim's Unfinished Thoughts"]

[Text] One of the "old boys" of the AKP (ml) [The Workers' Communist Party (M-L)], Tron Ogrim, has written a book. In the foreword he calls attention to the book's being disorderly, unfinished and only intended for redeemed Marxist-Leninists. This is the most precise summation that Ogrim attempts in the 227 pages of the book. For us outsiders the book gives nothing but a confirmation that AKP looks like it will never be finished with internal discussions of what is the correct analysis and who will ever come close to having it. In other words: wandering in the wilderness continues.

Now it can perhaps be objected that it is unfair to Ogrim to report on a book which he himself emphasized was only "written for the family." But the publisher, Oktober obviously, sent it to us and must have intended something by that. The book has the meager and concise title: "Western Maoism's Collapse and Crisis in the AKP (ml)--A Contribution to Debate on Party Theory."

It did become a contribution to debate, too. The background for the book, according to Ogrim, is conversations which he has had with party comrades. Instead of writing 10 or 100 articles in KLASSEKAMPEN he assembled them into a book and entered into an agreement with Oktober to print the book in a limited edition and only allow it to be sold in 1982.

With a lick and a promise Ogrim flies over the development of Western Maoism and the Norwegian AKP (ml). Not a little frustration is expressed in his writing, mostly over his party's position today. As is known, it is not too inspiring, and Ogrim believes that the "crisis" can still continue for many years. The author undoubtedly has a point when he states that some of the failures can be because the student barricade stormers, previously so active,

now find themselves in well-established families and surroundings. As with most of us, this group is now more occupied with jobs, houses and savings than with world revolution.

Now the entire cause of the "crisis" can not be blamed on this, but it is understandable that Ogrim is frustrated that the party is going through a bad period at the same time as the party, according to the author, should have more union members than ever. Apart from Ogrim's picture of the world it is also surely a point that the AKP should have been larger during the economic decline in the West with increased unemployment as a consequence.

What strikes one when reading Ogrim's book is that Marxist-Leninists live in another world than most of the rest of us. We just do not speak the same language. One must ask if this is not the cause of the AKP's weak position: We others do not feel that they are the problems of our world that Ogrim is analyzing. In addition, it is totally unimportant for at least 99 percent of Norwegian voters which "party comrade" was correct at what time. Ogrim has therefore demonstrated a rare form of realism when he, together with Oktober, agreed to print the book in a limited edition.

Also, the party chairman himself, Pal Steigan, has come out with a new book. "Answer to Indictment--A Defense of Marxism" is the name of his book. It consists mostly of previous speeches given by Steigan.

After having read the book, one is wiser when it comes to understanding Steigan's political viewpoint. He is fully convinced that Marxist theory is very good and correct. Individuals will perhaps maintain that is malicious to insist that there is something religious about Steigan's defense of Marxism, but those who read the book will see a relationship between the way he attacks the Bible in his speeches, and the way he defends "Das Kapital."

One must ask whether Steigan should not have carefully avoided attacking the Christian belief, while in the same book stating that "belief" is the foundation of his own attitude toward Marxism.

9287

CSO: 3108/136

PCP OFFICIAL DISCUSSES POLITICAL SITUATION, HIS PARTY'S POSITION

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 9 Jul 82 pp 18-19

[Interview with Alvaro Cunhal, secretary general of the PCP, by Rogerio Rodrigues; date and place not give]

[Text] In a written response to a questionnaire provided by O JORNAL, the secretary general of the PCP undertook a lengthy analysis of the present political situation, explaining his party's position, in the controversial PRP [Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat] issue, among others.

At a time he regards as particularly delicate, and even alarming--to the point that he stated that, through the revision of certain constitutional articles, the AD [Democratic Alliance] is preparing for a "coup d'etat"--Cunhal believes that the present party structure has not been crystallized, and that it would not be surprising if new party groups were to emerge. Nor does he underestimate the importance of the independents in Portuguese politics. If the PCP were called upon, by an expression of the popular will, to carry out government functions, the participation in such a government of individuals who are not politically on the left would not be excluded, the communist leader also said.

O JORNAL: The PCP was the only leftist party which did not express any solidarity with the PRP prisoners on their hunger strike. Knowing that appeals have been made to such institutions as the presidency of the republic and the church itself from the post various ideological sectors urging a solution such that lives need not be sacrificed, how do you interpret the silence of the PCP? What solutions would the PCP offer, if asked, for the problem of the PRP prisoners?

Alvaro Cunhal: In the case you mention there are widely diverse and controversial aspects pertaining to possible illegalities and irregularities (claimed by some and challenged by others) in the preparations for the trial, in the court proceedings and the sentencing, in the prison system and the human situation of the prisoners. If the issue were limited to this series of aspects, the PCP might have adopted another attitude.

But the campaign about this case was pursued in other terms. It was intended to represent not only the prisoners regarded as individuals in terms of their convictions, but also the acts in which they engaged or which they promoted

(armed bank robberies resulting in a number of deaths) as aspects of political action in the April Portugal.

The PCP believes that such activities cannot be acknowledged as political in nature, and therefore it has always stood aside from a campaign obviously designed to encourage such confusion for purposes which, on the part of some, are not yet today entirely clear.

Political Independents

[Question] Dr Alvaro Cunhal said at the last AVANTE! festival that "the participation of the PCP in the government is indispensable." In what way, in the view of the PCP, could this participation come about? Through an alliance with the PS [Socialist Party]? Through a joint leftist program? Would the PCP abandon the APU [United People Alliance] (in legislative elections) and engage in other alliances without the MDP [Portuguese Democratic Movement]?

[Answer] The statement you quote in your question is incomplete and taken out of the context in which it was made. What was said was that "the participation of the PCP in the government is indispensable for the solution of the national problems." It was not said that it is indispensable as an alternative, since in addition, it was made clear in that same speech that "we are prepared to consider all the possible solutions."

A government with communist participation could be of various structural types. It would not necessarily have to be the product of a joint program, nor even an electoral coalition.

Under the present circumstances, nothing has changed in the intention of the PCP to participate in a coalition with the MDP (in the APU), both in the legislative elections and those for the self-governing bodies. But we are certain that the possibility of a broader electoral coalition would be welcomed not only by ourselves, but by our comrades in the MDP as well.

On the subject of alliance with the PS, it is not yet known what socialist party or parties we will have in Portugal in the short, medium and long range, in view of the profound contradictions and divisions existing within this party. In any case, we will continue to work for unity among all democrats, specifically the communists and socialists.

As there are also profound divisions within the PSD and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], and these parties have lost a large part of their support base, we can conclude that the political party picture is not yet definitively crystallized in terms of four major parties and half a dozen smaller ones, such that it would not be surprising if new political groups were to emerge.

There are, furthermore, numerous independents unaffiliated with any of the existing parties, which nonetheless have a potential for real influence on political life. They must also be taken into account.

We make these comments with a view to early elections, if the Assembly of the Republic is dissolved prior to the unconstitutional and coup-oriented revision of the constitution planned on the basis of the agreement between the AD and Mario Soares. And not only early elections, but elections held under truly democratic conditions, which presupposes a democratic electoral law (which could be that in effect) and a government not of the AD, with or without Balsemao, but one which respects legality and the norms of democracy.

We are persuaded that elections held under such conditions would mean a resounding defeat for the AD and a general advance for the democratic forces. This would without any doubt result in an immediate consolidation of our institutions, a new impulse for popular action, a drastic strengthening of the democratic movements and a considerable increase in the influence of the socialists who condemn the PS alliance with the AD and urge a democratic policy.

All of this would open up possibilities for agreements with a view to the alternative of a democratic government.

Soares and the PS

[Question] How would this participation in government be possible when it has been said that Dr Mario Soares is a right-wing politician, without any credibility at all in the left wing, and after confident statements that Mario Soares could not count on the communist votes if he were to run for the presidency of the republic?

[Answer] It does not appear that the formation of a government with the participation of the communists would require that they regard Soares as a leftist politician, or that they vote for him if he should run for the presidency of the republic. The difficulties in achieving an agreement between the PCP and PS do not arise from the way we regard the policies of Soares, but from those policies themselves. However, Mario Soares is not the whole of the democratic sector exclusive of the PCP, nor even the whole of the PS today.

What will determine PCP participation in the government, should it occur, will be basically the will of the people, the results of the elections and the understanding on the part of the other democratic sectors of the need for such participation in order to resolve the economic, social and political problems of Portugal. We do not exclude participation in such a government by men who cannot be regarded as leftist politicians.

[Question] How do you interpret the requirement that the coalition forces in an electoral alliance use their own symbols, that is to say the fact that the PCP cannot solicit votes along with the MDP under the sign of the "little hoops"? Does the PCP think that its identification with the hammer and sickle may lose it votes?

[Answer] Both where the symbols are concerned and with regard to the mobile polling places, accompanying votes, the participation of independents, the diversity of a given party's coalitions, and restrictions on electoral propaganda, the new law, with elections just a few months away, not only introduces

methods which falsify the democratic nature of the elections, but is also seeking to get at the PCP and the United People Alliance directly. The United People Alliance has a collective, widely known and respected symbol which became the badge of municipal management by the PCP-MDP-independent coalition. To prevent the use of this symbol is discriminatory, and therefore in violation of the basic principles of the constitution and the general laws, and is of an undemocratic nature. Moreover, it suffices to read the headlines in the reactionary newspapers to understand that it is a question of a petty coup. One in CORREIO DA MANHA, for example, screams "down with the little hoops," and O DIA proclaims joyously: "PC Must Show Hammer and Sickle."

If this new law pertaining to the elections for self-governing bodies is promulgated, the democratic nature of the elections will be seriously affected. But we for our part are readying ourselves for the electoral battle, and we are confident that the Portuguese people will prove more aware and forewarned than the reactionary leaders realized in drafting and getting approval (with the scandalous abstention of the PS deputies) for this new antidemocratic law.

Fascists in the Regime

[Question] In your speech at the conclusion of the AVANTE! festival, you reasserted the need for the dissolution of the AD cabinet, making the statement that "the people do not want fascists in power." Does the PCP think that the present government is fascist? What would be the alternative within the left wing to the AD, in the view of the PCP?

[Answer] For two questions, there are two answers. The first: as is known, the statement "the people do not want fascists in the government" is a popular slogan, widely known and frequently used in chants at mass gatherings and demonstrations. In answer to your question, we can say that the present government is not fascist, but there are fascists in the government--specifically, the cabinet and the Assembly of the Republic. We do not say that all the members of the PSD and the CDS are fascists. But many of their leaders and other responsible officials are that to their very marrow. No great amount of explanation is necessary to conclude this.

The fascist base underlying the policy of the government is seen not only in the class content and goals, but also in the methods and procedures used in action (monopolization of the state apparatus, systematic use of the basest lies, slander and provocation, use of the mass media for primary anticommunism, systematic discrimination against all democrats and repression).

It can be seen that the present government is the faithful and obedient defender of reestablishment of the economic power and the privileges of the heavy capitalists and estate owners who, making use of a fascist dictatorship, deplorably exploited and savagely oppressed the Portuguese people for 48 years.

Their methods of action represent a systematic violation of the constitution and democratic legality, arbitrary and despotic decision making, violence and repressive methods, usurpation of power, attempts to do away with freedoms, agrarian reform, the nationalizations, the rights of the workers and small farmers, and other April conquests.

On the ideological level, it suffices to read what those who support the AD government write. Their language can now hardly be distinguished from that of the fascist era, and their ideas seem to be carbon copies of those developed by the scribblers employed by Salazar and Caetano.

We warn of the dangers inherent in a revision of the constitution resulting from the AD agreement with Soares and his group. We fear that if such a revision is carried forward, political developments will then force many to agree with us on the fact that what can be discerned behind the AD is fascism. The alternative, when it comes to political structure, may be broader or narrower, and may or may not be "within the left wing."

The basic thing is that democrats and patriots join together on the basis of a platform which will allow the country to resolve the very serious problems which exist.

PCP Did Not Support Eanes

[Question] With regard to General Eanes as president of the republic, the PCP has in recent times shown some reticence, accusing him of a lack of sensitivity to the appeals by the masses that he dismiss the cabinet. In your most recent address, you posed some questions for him, claiming that in the name of personal dignity and the post entrusted to him, Ramalho Eanes should now dismiss this cabinet. Does the PCP think that Ramalho Eanes has failed to keep the promises made to the electorate? Does the PCP plan to oppose Ramalho Eanes if he does not find an alternative to this government other than within the AD itself?

[Answer] To ask whether the PCP "plans to oppose Ramalho Eanes" implies an error as to the position the PCP has adopted with regard to the current president of the republic. The phrasing suggests that the PCP has supported the president of the republic, or his policy and his decisions. According to the line we adopted when Eanes first ran as a candidate, we neither supported nor opposed him. We urged votes for Eanes in 1980 and we continue to believe that this PCP attitude was not only entirely just but a determining factor in the defeat of the AD candidate, the fascist General Soares Carneiro, and the salvation of the democratic regime.

Our party has not just shown "some reticence" about the conduct of the current president. It has adopted divergent and critical positions about some of his decisions, although we think that, in view of the counterrevolutionary offensive, his role in the stabilization of the democratic regime in recent years has in general been positive. At this time, if he does not promptly adopt measures to put an end to the work of destruction being pursued by the AD in the government and in the Assembly of the Republic and to block the coup d'etat being pursued with the revision of the constitution, he will cease to exercise the authority conferred upon him by the constitution, which in our view must be exercised to save democracy. It remains to be seen what President Ramalho Eanes will do or will not do to define a future position.

An alternative to the present government within the AD itself would be an alternative of personalities, not of policy. And the essential thing for the defense of the regime is a political alternative, a democratic alternative, i.e., one without the AD.

No to Nuclear Weapons

[Question] Finally, the PCP has adopted as its great foreign policy theme the defense of peace, and elimination of nuclear weaponry in Europe by the Americans. In your address in Sofia at the Dimitrov centennial, you said: "It is true that all nuclear weapons are equally deadly. But nuclear weapons in the hands of imperialism can be used to launch war, while nuclear weapons in the hands of the USSR and the other socialist countries are not used to wage war, but to guarantee peace." Setting aside this philosophy of "two weights and two measures," don't you think that nuclear weapons, whether in the hands of the USSR or those of the United States, are always weapons of war and that the elimination of the one should involve the elimination of the other?

[Answer] The question and the ideas contained within it suggest three answers or comments.

The first is that there is no change in the basic orientation of the PCP with regard to Portuguese foreign policy. There is, however, a change and a deterioration in the international situation. If we stress the defense of peace increasingly, it is because the danger of war has been aggravated. We deem it necessary that Portuguese foreign policy pursue three basic goals: the defense of our national independence (political, economic and military), the defense of the democratic regime and the defense of peace. This is the reason for the requirement that foreign relations be diversified and that friendly and cooperative relations be established with all of the peoples of the world.

The second comment has to do with what you call "two weights and two measures." The statement of mine which you quoted and on which you comment has to do not with the effects of the possible use of the weapons by either of the two parties which possess them (the effects would be the same whoever uses them) but the abysmal difference between the policies of the two leading nations possessing them--the policy of the USSR in defense of peace, clarification, international cooperation, disarmament (this is why the nuclear weapons it has serve to guarantee peace), and the policy of the United States of banking on the armaments race (of which the production of the neutron bomb and the use of the cosmos for military purposes are examples), aggression and dangerous nuclear blackmail (it is for this reason the nuclear weapons it has are in the service of a policy of war).

The third comment is that I agree entirely with the last statement contained in your question. All nuclear weapons, whoever controls them, should be eliminated.

This is in fact a demand of the peoples and the forces of peace as well (the PCP too), as an indispensable and inevitable prerequisite for an international agreement on the elimination (as well as the reduction) of nuclear weapons.

EXTREME RIGHT FANS FEARS OF REVOLUTION

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 9 Jul 82 p 8

[Article by Ismael Medina: "We Are Experiencing Revolutionary Escalation At Its Height"]

[Text] The popular saying that hiccups is a sign of life in children, and of death in the aged, is instructive. The parliamentary dictatorship to which we Spaniards have been subjected is suffering an irreversible attack of political hiccups.

A Finished System

The "young democracy" is only an embalmed corpse of the corrupt, political bossist, doctrinaire parliamentarism of the 19th century, which a combination of wallflower plotters and horrifying revolutionaries persisted in disinterring and setting up, with no motivation other than their own advantage and that of satisfying their internationalist "sponsors." The hiccups besetting the parliamentary dictatorship and subjecting its skeleton to tragicomic convulsions of a carnival-like mummy should be considered a sure harbinger of imminent demise.

It is true that people are capable of infinite resignation and amazing degrees of degeneracy; but any political system that rests on the people's resignation or degeneracy lacks viability. It may last for a relative period of time, struggling awkwardly in the muddy water. On some occasion, it might even possibly appear to have recovered the reins of power. And so what? Nothing and no one will save it from dying, hanged by its own belt. When this happens in any nation, the only speculation that befits the observer is that concerning the time, and possibly what will come afterward. In no instance is there any margin for doubt about the outcome.

It is useless to devote more attention than what is merely informational to the convulsions of the parliamentary dictatorship. The UCD [Democratic Center Union] scheming at Moncloa for the removals and assignments lacks substantive value. It offers so much that they might assign Landelino or anyone else to the UCD's presidential niche. A building in ruins cannot be strengthened by merely putting puppets at its facade or replacing the doorman. The instructive monotony of history teaches us that, when a political system reaches such a degree of functional decompensation and vital collapse, it has no solution other than that of the operating room. The more it is delayed, the more difficult the repair will be.

However, the willingness to put the sick body on the operating table which is gradually becoming nonexistent in the "state of the autonomies" does not suffice, as we have learned during the parliamentary hodge-podge of the LOAPA [Organic Law for Harmonization of the Autonomous Process]. A suitable surgeon, who is also nonexistent in the political areas of the consensus, is needed in addition. Felipe Gonzalez is only a very poor instrument maker; and Fraga is an insane manufacturer of rhetorical sausages, acting as a stretcher-bearer. And what about the UCD trilateral? some deluded persons, who are never lacking, may insist. They are like the clowns used in circuses to entertain the respectable people while they remove the tight-rope walkers' props to replace them with the lion's cage.

Spain, Besieged by the Fire and Blood of Revolution

While UCD was engaged in the ceremony to raise Landelino to the niche, Barcelona was surrounded by fire and the Catalanian legislative assembly was trembling, in the belief that the flames of hell were close. The pressing reality of Spanish politics has been reduced, with tragic symbolism, to fire in Catalonia and blood in the Basque Country. In the history of mankind, fire and blood have always been the warning signs of revolution. Anyone who does not happen to read the ominous portents written in the sky on on earth by the red flames and red blood will be destroyed by the revolution.

The fires set around Barcelona were deliberate, as admitted by the pertinent, but by no means competent authorities.

It is claimed that the blaze was set by hooded individuals who knew their job and had prepared for escape with similar terrorist perfection. The careful technique used in this uncommon attack was reflected in rapid spread and spectacular formation of an encirclement around an overpopulated urban area. It is now being said thereabouts that those who set the fire sought to make use of the World Soccer semifinals to have the fire attain international dimensions. The fact is far more serious, and simpler: it is a typical action to spread terrorism.

An ancestral panic dating back thousands of years still seizes modern man faced with the great shocks of natural phenomena, which make him feel simultaneously powerless and fascinated. With the forest fires, the terrorists are not seeking merely the economic and social effects that have been overly publicized; they are seeking collective panic effects more assiduously. The terrorists will be all the more powerful, the greater the instinctive dread that they arouse. This is their strength, translated into two types of social behavior which benefit them: inhibition and acceptance.

The escalation of terrorism in the Basque Country, with explosions and assassinations, is inseparable from the spectacular action in Catalonia, and the Andalucian outbreak, with sporadic bombings and fires set on crops, regarding which the Socialists' convenience has placed a despicable mantle of silence. Although the political authorities have chosen to conceal it, the Ministries of Interior and Defense have, for a long time, had valuable information available to them concerning the recruitment and training, by ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] agents in other parts of Spain, of the corresponding armies of national liberation.

Part of the recruitment has been done by the ETA members in prisons, among criminals propitious for their political ideas. "Legal" members of ETA have been and are traveling busily to Catalonia, Levante or Andalucia, under the innocent guise of tourist activity or family relations, for the purpose of setting up the organization. Once they have been tested and involved in insignificant types of action, the new terrorists are sent to camps abroad, usually in Algeria, for instruction. At the beginning of the year, over 100 were back in Andalucia.

There are also reliable reports on intensive clandestine arms trafficking throughout all of Spain, one of its distribution centers being in southern Portugal. A certain communist organization, ostensibly a dissident one, has created small armed groups in nearly all the Andalucian towns, almost always with the harmless appearance of groups of friends fond of hunting. Their mission will be the "hunt for fascists" if the anticipated revolutionary situation occurs.

ETA Has Left the Hands of PNV

The current escalation of terrorism appears to be concealing purposes more ambitious than the previous ones, as one learns from its widespread nature and methods. The hypocritical, frightened document of the Euzkadi government is typical of the bourgeoisie stupidly going along with the revolutionaries, believing in their superiority, and expressing dismay when they discover that the revolution is stronger than they are. The most foolish and reprehensible sector of the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] has now admitted nearly everything that we have been claiming for years to be strategic and tactical goals of the secessionist Red terrorists. But the suicidal obstinacy of the Basque nationalists appears again in the communique. Their backward separatist obduracy has caused a reduction in the Basques' dread of the consequences, making it reasonable to suspect that they would be happy and relieved in the event that the terrorists were to do outside of the Basque Country what they threw in their faces too late. It is also noticeable that the largest amount of panic lies in the possibility that a national reaction might occur that would regenerate the national state, capable of undertaking what should have been done 6 years ago.

There are two extremely important confessions in the communique from the Vitoria clique, which I deem necessary to stress. The first is this: "It is a matter of judging a criminal activity that is becoming an end in itself." What is implied in this anxious disclosure is extremely serious. Does it mean that the ETA's crimes were justified when its goals were common and favored a joint commitment of independence, without endangering the economic and social statute of the Basque nationalist bourgeoisie?

The second one is associated with the former, and reinforces the suspicions: "Euskadi is running an imminent risk of economic collapse, and this generation could be the one responsible for turning over to the Basques of the future an impoverished country, after having received it in an economically privileged situation." I shall avoid stressing that the separatist political bosses dread losing their privileged status when, finally, they see the horns of the Red beast of revolution.

The 1936 situation is being repeated now, as well as the attitude of that time, when the neanderthal clique of the time chose to make common cause with the revolutionary assassins, rather than accept the existence of a common cause with

the rest of the Spanish people, based upon fundamental values of a religious nature and the preservation of human dignity. But the cynicism of these individuals has reached a height when they accept a privileged situation for the Basque Country and are silent about what they owe to the benefits from the national state and to the contribution from all Spaniards. They conceal the fact that this "economically privileged" legacy, which is now half-destroyed, is the work of Spain, and by no means of an unconscientious, minority gang of separatists.

Nonexistent State and Government?

And what is the "state of the autonomies" doing in the face of this very serious revolutionary situation and the collapse of the nation? The usual: lying, deceiving, making sharp deals, hiccuping and turning furiously against all the sectors, institutions and ideas capable of fostering the rescue of Spain, and able to fulfill the people's ambitions for national solidarity and reconstruction.

At the present time, we are experiencing a critical situation wherein all of us Spaniards are risking essential values, a great common historical legacy and the future of the nation and of our children. We cannot continue any longer calmly witnessing the spectacle of a political group cowed by the revolutionary attack, complacent toward the enemies of the people and incapable of adopting the standby measures that the situation requires.

The government is inexcusably dutybound to make use of the Constitution and, depending on what is feasible for the importance of the danger, to declare martial law, standby status or a state of war. A state which does not cope with its responsibilities is a nonexistent state, whose void is always filled by the society, based on historical necessity.

2909

CSO: 3110/182

PSOE ACCUSES RIGHT OF SOWING FEAR OF LEFTIST VICTORY

Madrid EL SOCIALISTA in Spanish 23-30 Jun 82 pp 20, 21

[Article by Julio Bernardez: "The Right That Never Quits"]

[Text] The Right in this country never gets discouraged. Now it is involved in spreading fear, creating fear in society about the possibility of a socialist victory at the polls. Because this time the methods used in other years are not appropriated; no one any longer believes the fairy tales about what the socialists will do with savings in case they win, so they are promoting another kind of fear. Since they are not able to slander their opponents, they use the technique of continuous poisoning, half truths and unfounded rumors. All this with the obvious goal of presenting the image of weakened democratic institutions before society.

It is true that the government and its party are not experiencing their finest hour, but personal struggles for position or a longing for an official car cannot and should not be a cause for needing an administrative government. Some stated--in the times of "UCD [Democratic Center Union] for 107 years"--that the centrists were all applying to be ministers, and that the main problem--for Suarez at that time--was how to form a government and satisfy everyone. Now that they see their highest aspirations--ministerial chairs--cut short, they are seeking new places in the sun; they are changing their affiliations because of purely local problems, petty politics, and they are giving the ultimate impression that something is going wrong in Spanish democracy, when the truth is that if anything is wrong, they are--and their ambitions, which are shabby because they are small.

We have seen clear proof of this up to the saturation point in the first week of the invasion by World Cup football. The results of the voting in Congress, including the abstention in the important subject of the public defender, show very clearly that there is a segment of the Right which is in a hurry, because this matter is being concluded as quickly as possible. There are constitutional methods for dealing with this, and the president of the government--and only he--has the constitutional power to end the current legislature, but some of people who have changed over with the idea of seeking their own place in the sun, are prepared to rationalize--and are even trying to make reasonable--some other solution. To put it bluntly, they are seeking what they like to call administrative government, which is a euphemism which hides a

non-constitutional government, outside the institutions. This not only is unacceptable, but it demonstrates the narrow-mindedness of those who once called themselves reformers and genuine democrats. They are now showing that they were only in favor of minimal change, for Lampedusian change, the exact amount so that everything would continue to be the same. This society has given ample proof of wanting change, and those men of the right want to hold it back in some way, even if this restraint is unconstitutional. It is not only alarming that this is going on, it is extremely serious, because playing at administration 2 years ago, at the time when Tarradellas was singing the praises of a change of helm, led us to the 23 February drama.

Priorities

Going beyond such petty objectives, we must think about a more promising future for this country. Therefore we must continue governing with the Constitution in hand, and we must be serious about the priorities which are essential before the end of the legislature. In the first place, it appears to be necessary to end the discussion, and make a public announcement to that effect, so that the LOAPA [Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomies Process] can subsequently be voted on by Parliament. The government--and its party--cannot put aside future legislation for the sake of holding back the LOAPA now, in order to later create a natural majority with the support of the nationalist minorities, or at least with the support of one them, the Catalonians.

The LOAPA, which has been under discussion for a year, should already be law, because it cannot remain permanently blackmailed by the Basque nationalists. It continues to be a serious matter to hear them say that the LOAPA means the end of the Basque Country's agreement with the State, because saying that, in time like these, is staying outside of history on one side, and trying to cause a provocation on the other.

The LOAPA cannot go to sleep the sleep of the just in the very same bedroom as the LAU [Law for University Autonomy], because the shaping of the Statutes of the Autonomies once and for all is basic for Spanish democracy. It is a challenge for it, and a challenge cannot be carried as a burden indefinitely. Maria Izquierdo recalled in EL PAIS that in past days even Juan Maria Bandres stated that the LOAPA was necessary; although that is public knowledge, the Basque Left deputy is not for the LOAPA which is being discussed today. Very well, then, let the LOAPA be completed before the sovereign public is called to the polls, and later perfected, but let us not put off til tomorrow what can be successfully and necessarily done today.

Poisonings

It is also of top priority importance to find the poisoner. It appears that, finally, the minister of defense has decided to take action, and is going to look for the sources, the origins of that mass of misinformation, the ones who are trying to cause disorientation in society, who are looking for trouble--if not more--in the barracks. They are promoting argument, even violent argument, so as to create more dissension in the Armed Forces. It is contemptible, but it is being carried on with tireless diligence.

The poisoners, looking at it realistically, convinced that the cause for February 1981 was never going to be found, and even more convinced that there would be no sentences, are seeking again to weaken Spanish democracy, never resting, like continual lightning. This is the result of not having investigated the civilian connection in the plot. The policy of Oliart, which even his own colleagues in the cabinet are now criticizing, has produced these results, which are far from desirable for democracy. It is of utmost importance to find out why they are leaking things that ought not be leaked, why the leaks always have the same vehicle, and why internal Armed Forces memorandums immediately appear in public. All of this should be, must be, investigated, because the policy of the ostrich with his head in the sand is the worst and blindest of policies.

We cannot be passive in this matter, because liberty, which millions of Spaniards voted for as what they considered best and what they wanted for their government, is at stake. The poisoning which was meticulously engineered during the disorderly exodus of the centrists is creating the necessary culture medium for making fear a norm. We must insist on seriousness and historic responsibility from those people who only are using politics as a means toward an official car.

The Defender

The results for the voting for Public Defender can be understood within the context of all the above. A man with a long democratic history, who trained at his side a large number of the cadres of the two most important parties--in number of seats--in this country, does not deserve a vote of censure. A convinced democrat, he does not deserve the vote which the joint session has come up with. In matters of less importance there have been impressive unanimous votes; in this one which involves a basic factor in the life of the country's democratic institutions, there has been a result which is more than surprising, it is to be condemned. If this is the way things are, and the way that things continue to be when it comes time to vote in each chamber for the Public Defender, who already is the sole candidate, it is going to be difficult for them to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority. It is to be hoped that in the Congress the logic of voting discipline may win out over any doubts, but in the Senate the spokesman of the Center has already publicly affirmed that he will allow the senators of his group to vote freely. More than one senator--from other groups--has already shown that they already possess that freedom, which is nothing more than the recognition of a reality, but it seems irresponsible to make it public at the time of going into the voting for Public Defender, specifically for this public defender named Jaquin Ruiz-Gimenez Cortes.

It should be remembered--as in the above-mentioned case of the LOAPA--that it is a good thing that matters are getting done before calling the people to elections. It is of top priority importance to choose the public defender, without the need to steal the vote in the Parliament.

The PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] gave some proof of its seriousness in the week of 14 to 20 June, that it is acting over and above party interests,

that it is struggling to insure that the country can be governed, that the consolidation of democracy is its foremost goal. The facts are there, are public and well known, and it is not necessary to press the point. To remember them, yes, because the Left--that left which some rightist sectors which are egotistical and no friends of progress and modernity--want to make feared, is giving more examples of responsibility than is the Right--which is seeking various different and at least debatable ways to keep itself in power. If problems must be solved, if it is obvious that this legislature is not going to last much longer, then it should finish up the necessary work, and give place--immediately afterward, never before finishing--to the sovereign people, so that they can express their will. That is the only way to govern Spain, and not to "administrate" it.

8131

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UGT REDONDO ACCUSES PCE CAMACHO OF DESPERATION TACTICS

Madrid EL SOCIALISTA in Spanish 23-30 Jun 82 pp 34-36

[Interview with Nicolas Redondo, secretary general of UGT [General Union of Workers], by Sol Padilla of EL SOCIALISTA: "Dispute Between UGT and CCOO [Workers Commissions]": date and place not specified.]

[Text] Since his spectacular departure from the executive board of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] Marcelino Camacho has thrown himself into a sharp attack on the UGT. Nicolas Redondo attributed the virulent attacks which have been launched by the communist federation against the UGT to nervousness in the communist movement and the use of Camacho by the pro-Soviets in the PCE.

The secretary general of the UGT believes that the two reasons why Camacho has attacked the UGT are, basically, the beginning of the union elections and the nervousness which exists within the CCOO regarding the crisis stirred up by the different political factions inside it. The crisis has polarized around the Carrilloists and anti-Carrilloists; and between both positions the union has been severely damaged, as has the PCE itself. "Within the framework of these two causes--union elections and the internal crisis of the CCOO--Marcelino Camacho is coming out with such ill-advised public speeches as the one he just made against the UGT, which he accuses of being linked to the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] in contrast to the supposed independence of the CCOO. Camacho tries to argue that his resignation as deputy and now as an executive of the PCE means that the CCOO is independent from that party. Then, what does that mean--asks Nicolas Redondo--Can it be that there was no independence before, and now there is? I believe--adds Redondo--that the Camacho drama is the crisis of the communist movement in Spain, in which the crisis of the CCOO also is involved."

"But, to refute that supposed independence of the CCOO, one only needs to read the statements of Nicolas Sartorius in the newspaper EL PAIS to find out that the vast majority of the CCOO leaders are out-and-out Eurocommunists," Nicolas Redondo points out.

Nicolas Redondo spoke on this subject with EL SOCIALISTA, and touched on other labor union topics which the UGT is studying today.

[Question] What influence is this attack by the Workers Commissions going to have on future relations between the two unions?

[Answer] We are in the midst of an election campaign, and at this time it is natural that there should be signs of difference in strategy which divide some unions from others. But this vicious and almost Stalinist attack is bringing about a real deterioration in relations between the unions.

A Straw Man

I understand, from the human point of view, that Camacho may be nervous and is making sectarian statements like this, at a time when the communist movement is in collapse and has only been able for a few years to take a major part in political and union life. As we are seeing, this communist movement is little by little being diminished, not only on the political level, but also on the union level. If to this we add Camacho's personal characteristics it is only logical that at times he expresses matters using kindergarten arguments. He is always repeating that he is not a straw man for anyone. I believe, however, that he is one, and moreover that he is being made use of by various sectors. As I understand it, in his latest statements it can be observed that he is being manipulated, perhaps without being aware of it, by the more radical pro-Soviets, that is, by those who advance independence of the union with respect to Carrillo's PCE.

Because of this I believe that his latest statements are indeed unfortunate, and are causing a natural deterioration in relations between the two unions just when the union elections are upon us, which already in themselves can be expected to produce differences.

Union Elections

[Question] What is the UGT's view of the coming union elections?

[Answer] The UGT views these elections within a broad context, and not only with the idea of winning. We have said this many times. The way we look at it, they should have been put off, in view of the serious problems which the nation must face in the next few months. We think that the union elections should not take place at the same time as the legislative ones, as it appears is going to happen. However, the UGT is going into the union elections with nothing to lose and indeed much to gain; because even in the worse of cases we would continue to be the force that we are now, that is, the second largest federation in the country. But also, without overemphasizing winning at all, objective conditions exist at this time for the UGT to become the majority union in the country. I believe that we can easily achieve this goal, and we are going to dedicate ourselves to doing that. Camacho seems to be blind to the evidence of this objective situation; as when he said that the CCOO would win in Ensidesa, and later when it did not go that way, he did not want to recognize it and is looking for a thousand excuses not to accept the facts.

Joint Bargaining, With or Without Reconciliation

[Question] How does the UGT appraise the ANE [National Agreement on Employment] at this time, and how is the coming collective bargaining viewed?

[Answer] Here we have a complex situation. On one hand it appears that the fundamental objective of the ANE, that of maintaining the same level of employment in December 1982 as in December 1981, is going to be achieved. This means that we would find in December 1982 that that fundamental ANE condition has been fulfilled. But on the other hand, it is also true that the number of unemployed is increasing, as a result of new generations entering the job market, and the administration is maintaining a regressive policy with regard to the employment of these youths. On the other hand, neither has the administration made very much of an effort to inform the workers about how to use the 15 billion peseta fund which they obtained to broaden unemployment coverage. And in other matters, like medical assistance, there are very few workers who know about their existence, to a large extent because of the carelessness of the administration in putting sufficient application forms and information at the disposal of the workers. Also, the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] does not want to sign any trilateral agreement, which we unions are backing, as it is the only one shared in common among all the workers, both the active and the passive ones.

We unions have chosen to maintain employment in the ANE; just as in the AMI [Framework Collective Bargaining Agreement] we chose to maintain the purchasing level of wages, and that effort has not been compensated for either by the CEOE or by the administration, inasmuch as the latter is the largest business in the nation, since on it depend the category of public administration workers, the workers in the national industries, retired and pensioned people, and the unemployed. The two agreements, the AMI and the ANE, took place within the context of a policy of reconciliation, in which the ANE substituted the demand for maintaining wages for that of maintaining employment. But it is going to be practically impossible in practice to continue that cooperation without taking into account the 2 million unemployed people that there are in our society, of whom more than a million are less than 25 years old. To ignore this group and to enter into bilateral negotiations only for the active workers or for certain sectors, as the CEOE seeks to do seems to me to be highly divisive.

Therefore we will see what the situation is at the end of the year, what ceiling the ANE will indicate, and meanwhile we will go to negotiations in which the UGT will, as always, act with the responsibility which characterizes it, but also with union power as a weapon. I do not know if there will be collaboration or not in that negotiation, but what I do know is that there will have to be an overall strategy and framework for all the sectors, so that the key sectors do not become alienated from the rest of the sectors through lack of coordination, causing serious divisions between some workers and others.

[Question] In this respect, how do you regard the negotiations between the metallurgical employers' group Confemetal and the metal workers' federation of the UGT?

[Answer] Those negotiations are directed toward changing the metal regulations, and do not have any negotiating significance. The Metal Federation is a strong and responsible federation, and has initiated these conversations with the employers within a logical context for changing certain regulatory standards which only affect the metallurgical workers. But that does not mean that they are going to go beyond those contacts.

UGT-PSOE Relations

[Question] Rumors have been circulating for some time about a certain criticism by the UGT with respect to the PSOE. What kind of relations are there between them at this time?

[Answer] Relations between the Socialist Party and the General Union of Workers are good and fraternal. We are part of the socialist family, and we are not giving it up. But each one has its own field, its own responsibilities and its problems. Therefore, there would be nothing strange about it if at some particular point there should be some differences. The thing is that these confrontations will never produce a split like the one that is occurring in the communist party. Because our differences are not the result of a struggle between different factions, as in the PCE, but the natural result of a different kind of responsibility. A union, in any case, should support a progressive government more than a rightist government; but always first of all defending the workers. In this sense the UGT will not support a government which is insensitive to the workers. That has always been our attitude, and it will continue to be this way, no matter what government may be in power.

On the contrary, Camacho's radical proposals continue to be very politically irresponsible. Anyone who may have followed the progress of the Camacho line a little in recent years will have been continually amazed to see how this man has been prepared to offer his support for 4 years to a UCD government, to the Calvo Sotelo government; and, however, put up such a vicious fight against the possibility of a progressive PSOE government. I believe that Marcelino Camacho is taking a mistaken line, because in seeking the failure of a progressive government he is aiming at the failure of the workers' movement, of the union movement, and even the CC00 themselves. I understand that there can be differences between various union federations; but what we cannot have among workers' federations is a total confrontation against a progressive government. Because if a government of change fails, the Right will monopolize the power, perhaps for decades, and that would mean disaster for all the workers, from which it would be difficult and would take a long time to recover.

It seems to me that the supposed vocation of independence which suddenly has hit Camacho is quite incomprehensible, especially, I repeat, when Camacho himself has given his support to the UCD government ever since the Moncloa agreements up until the latest attempt to sign a 4-year agreement with the Calvo Sotelo government, an agreement which the UGT has always opposed, and which it will oppose in the future.

8131

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EXTREME RIGHT DISSATISFIED WITH FRAGA'S COMPROMISES

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 12 Jul 82 p 6

[Article by Ismael Medina: "The Rechange of the Change"]

[Text] I have carefully read the statements made by Manuel Fraga Iribarne in ABC, sponsored by Dario Valcarcel, assistant director of public opinion for the former conservative-liberal-monarchist newspaper, now progressive-liberal-monarchist and hence semi-official spokesman for the liberal-socialist galaxie.

The Hodgepodge of the Natural Majority

My interest in Fraga's invasion in such a conspicuous display is not pointless. It is justified by some previous events: Manuel Cantero's lecture in Malaga ("The Quadruple Crisis in Present-Day Spain"), Fernando Suarez' intermittent appearances; the Areilza combinations; Herrero de Minon's dialectical accommodations; the anxiety reflecting history shown by Ricardo de la Cierva; Verstrynge's petulant statements, also in ABC; the uproar of Pastor Ridruejo, Perez Escolar and Ramon Hermosilla over the ashes of GODSA [Documentation and Orientation Office, Inc] and the fog in Juan Gris' office; the possible information on the purchase of the Masaveu Banks; Alfonso Osorio's political maneuvering; the confidential talks with the supposedly conservative secessionist parties; the "nationalist" disclosure of the Galicia Junta; the proclivity of certain "historicals" for being given a second chance to qualify for the drug of the natural majority; Kissinger's meticulous travels; and, in particular, the merciless "federalist" challenge from Rafael Arias-Salgado, in YA, to the Popular Alliance autocrat, at the cost of Antonio Carro's furtive intervention in the debate on the LOAPA [Organic Law for Harmonization of the Autonomous Process].

This and other material stirred into the informational cooking pot gives us the impression of witnessing a monstrous political hodgepodge, cooked up with the scraps from the great banquet of the democratic compromise movement. One is left as bewildered as Inspector Maigret faced with a crime the perpetrator of which has left around a great wealth of contradictory clues.

It has been very difficult for me to lend some order to this rigamarole, wherein the "rechange of the change" operation or that of "you leave, so that I may take a place," the only rational purpose of which consists of keeping up appearances, without changing the "spirit" nor the structures of the old compromise of democratization, is beginning to assume an intelligible shape. I emphasize, it has taken

me some time to put all this material in proper arrangement. The conclusions exceed the space of this article. I shall draw them from the chain of events. But, pressed for space, I shall summarize thusly: Fraga is determined to remain faithful to the compromises that have been made, and to become Suarez II.

The Alibis of Popular Alliance

I sometimes wonder about the chagrin that Fraga would experience if, all of a sudden, the Spanish Falange, New Force and Democratic Right were to announce their dissolution, giving way to a stringently national and radically social political movement emerging from the unified spirit of the people who have been defrauded by democratization. Fraga was given right-wing credibility by the well-intentioned persons who naively served as a cover for him in the 1977 elections, and whom, as had been anticipated, he crushed mercilessly, so as to keep only those who truly resembled him, including Antonio Carro. He backed his democratic credibility with the existence, presumably to his right, of political forces against which a persistent campaign of malice and accusations has been aimed, costing the "consensus" hundreds of millions, and at the price of the grim blowup of the National Union project in 1979.

Fraga has also sought an umbrella adulterated by doctrinal quality in the enlistment of some Christian Democrats prompted only by the very personal desire to be ensured a good position in the candidacies for the coming elections. And he has attempted a certain amount of progressive branding, through the incorporation of a Social Democratic embellishment, in such figures as Fernando Suarez. Although with less bluster, he has contracted the services of some who are "dissociated from the blues," confident that they would manipulate the emotional devices of the Movement's old structures among the people.

Nevertheless, the Popular Alliance control room is still in the hands of the original members of GODSA; and the goals are the same ones that Fraga preplanned for the center party in the voluminous compromise plan that he sent to Pio Cabanillas from Franco's embassy in the country of Her Gracious Majesty of Britain, when Suarez had not yet supplanted him in the graces of the Bilberderg Club to head the transition.

As would be learned from anyone cognizant of Fraga's statements in ABC, agreed upon with Dario Valcarcel, a change of "landscape" to Serrano Street, the "natural majority" is confined to the replacement of UCD-I by UCD-II, and of Suarez I by Suarez II; after the completion of the painful, forced interregnum of political Tancredism headed by Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo and Bustelo. Definitely, "the rechange of the change."

The difference between Fraga and Kissinger regarding the solution that "democratic Europe" expects from Spanish liberal-socialism is merely one of political intelligence and subtlety. Kissinger's intentions are difficult to discern. Fraga is like a woodcock in constant heat.

The Federalist Plot

Rafael Arias-Salgado has not concealed the true condition of the "state of the autonomies." In his attempt to justify LOAPA, he declared without pretense:

"And in all the federal and regional states in the world, without exception, there are laws similar to LOAPA. (...) I think that there is, whether wrong or right, a certain amount of resistance on the part of the historical communities to the spread of the autonomous process; but I tell you, to give an example, that in the United States, Alabama and California are equal from a legal and constitutional standpoint, and we shall head toward a Spain wherein all the regions and nationalities are equal among themselves and hence equal before the law. (...) That, and none other, is our plan for the state of the autonomies, and it is the one that we intend to put into practice."

The state which, for the past 6 years, has attempted to construct democracy at the cost of the destruction of Spain, is purely and simply a "parliamentary monarchy of federated states." One learns this from the statements of Rafael Arias-Salgado. This was agreed upon by the "democratic forces" during the conspiratory period, and this was completed when it was time to write the Constitution of 1978.

All those who participated in the constituent agreement were in accord on implementing the pact to make Spain a federation of states, based on the recognition of the "nationalities." The Spanish people were told quite the opposite in the referendum campaign and the election campaign of 1977, as well as on other vital occasions. None of the parties committed to the "consensus" disclosed the hidden intentions of the constituent pact. Nor did Popular Alliance, within which only Fraga, his trusted members of GODSA and certain individuals who were ostentatiously brought in at the last minute, were apparently in on the secret. This is what Rafael Arias-Salgado has thrown in Fraga's face, with understandable annoyance: "One of the most glaring aspects has been the total absence of Popular Alliance from the debate, and it is particularly noticeable that Manuel Fraga has not participated even once in that debate, and that the AP group has abstained from the voting."

A Reprehensible Flight

The debate and the voting on LOAPA were a fatal trap for Fraga, especially at a time when he was engaged in arduous negotiations with the Catalanian and Basque secessionists, whom he considers "conservatives," to affiliate them with the "natural majority." In this regard, the gentle treatment, so unusual in him, that Fraga has given in his statements to the two most tragic political problems confronting Spain today, even apart from terrorism: the Basque and Catalanian bourgeois independence movements, now joined underhandedly by the Galicia Junta's nationalists, under the Popular Alliance banner, is significant.

Fraga could not afford to participate in a debate that would leave any of the flanks of the "natural majority" put together so laboriously and weakly up in the air. Nor was the selection of Antonio Carro, the ideal person to work with the internationalist ambiguity, a mistake; as he has proven on several occasions, including that involving the Sahara.

The debate on LOAPA offered a remarkable opportunity for the exposure of the great fraud committed against the Spanish people represented by the substitution of the promised unity of Spain by a "federation of states." Why didn't Popular

Alliance do so? On that great occasion, why didn't it confirm the truth of the promises with which it is attempting to win the votes of a frightened and cowardly right? We are entitled to assume that neither Fraga nor Popular Alliance is equipped to break old and new commitments for political action, thanks to which they believe that the appropriation of broader areas of power is guaranteed. Nor can they ascribe to themselves a desire to do so.

Spain? Just as for the 19th century liberals so emotionally recalled by Fraga constantly, for the 20th century democrats the first thing is power.

The analysis of the current breaks, transfers and flights makes it clear, first of all, that UCD and AP are the result of the same twin birth. The only difference between the twins lies in the fact that UCD grew rapidly, having for itself, shared halfway with its step-brother PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], all the teats of liberal-socialist internationalism; while AP was turned over to the care of the Drop of Milk fund. UCD has burst from the indigestion, and now it is AP's turn.

Nevertheless, there is another matter which may possibly be more decisive regarding the individual positions. What really concerns the ardent champions of democracy is occupying first place in the candidacies for the next elections, which they consider imminent, although I, personally, regard them as unlikely.

The greatest difficulty for the preelectoral coalitions or the formation of a single party of the "natural majority" lies in the fact that no one is sure of the results, and everyone is refusing second-son positions which could leave them in the ditch without the appetizing sucking of power. It is only natural that those who do not obtain from the UCD Sanhedrin or from Fraga the guarantee of a number one spot in easy districts should decide to create their own parties and their own candidacies. Later, in the light of the results, the coalitions that suit them will be made, particularly if they ensure access to the government, the fabulous Eldorado for the greedy seekers of gold of the parliamentary dictatorship into which democracy has deteriorated.

2909

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FRAGA'S DEPUTY REVEALS PERSONALITY TRAITS

Madrid LOS DOMINGOS DE ABC in Spanish 4 Jul 82 pp 17-21

[Interview with AP Secretary General Jorge Verstrynge, by Josefina Martinez del Alamo; date and place not specified]

[Text] "You are too young."

And Winston Churchill, aged 27, who had just become a member of Parliament, replied: "That is the only shortcoming which the years correct."

The years will cure Jorge Verstrynge Rojas as well.

"The advantage of my age is that I can afford to risk making mistakes, and that they will forgive my mistakes because they will think, 'he is too young, he will learn.' That is quite a luxury."

At age 33, Jorge Verstrynge is the brilliant secretary general of Popular Alliance [AP], the enthusiastic assistant professor of theory of the state at the School of Political Sciences and Fraga's second in command (and most devoted follower), the "Alfonso Guerra" of AP, the "enfant terrible" and the uncommon politician of the new right.

"No traditional quality. Watch out! The Spanish right has some features with which I do not identify myself."

The most promising of the recent batch of young politicians, with an enthusiasm shared between Beethoven's "Fifth" and Joan Baez, he has an obsessive devotion to reading: books, hundreds of books read, reread, underlined and converted into quotations and subtle remarks. But he does not read poetry. And there is a touch of fondness for the losers, the persecuted, the "perverse" characters of official history.

And all this is embellished by a different physical appearance: as if they had dyed the Anthony Perkins of the 60's blond, to make him a Hitler youth hero. Bright, enthusiastic, convinced and rather impossible to convince (unless you are Manuel Fraga), restless, meticulous, practical, demanding, shy, overwhelming, enlightened. Mix and stir...this is Jorge Verstrynge...and serve quite cold.

"Welcome, welcome..." And he extends a taut hand to me, walking back and forth, excitedly, throughout the empty space of the room.

The living room is bright and inviting. Filtered lights, warm colors, soft background music and a certain air of delightful unrestraint; there are seven magic carpets covering the floor, and cushions scattered on the carpets; and there are books left in any corner, outside of the bookcase. The tables are covered with personal photographs: Maria, the fiancée; Maria, his wife; the wedding; the children; and a very different Jorge: with hair flowing in the wind and without the spectacles of an intellectual. Leaning on a shelf, bare and unframed, with an improvised appearance, there is a photograph of Manuel Fraga.

[Question] Is Fraga your idol?

[Answer] I like him very much as a person; I am greatly identified with him. But idolatry, by no means. The fact is that Fraga has a superior intelligence, and I respect intelligence. What is difficult for me is putting up with fools. But an intelligent man can be forgiven a great deal.

I met Fraga at the School of Politics. My first course coincided with the Matesa affair. That disappointed me terribly, because the person who exposed an unjust situation was the one who paid the consequences in the end.

When I met him, I was a very right-wing individual; and it was he who told me: "Watch out, Verstrynge! Order is essential, because there can be no liberty without order; but order is only a means for achieving liberty. It is a good thing for people to think differently, and that there are contrasting views." Thanks to Fraga, I have two values that I have not given up: intelligence and liberty. It has been difficult for me to attain them; and just because I realize now what they are worth, I shall never abandon them.

Those are my ideals; the rest is relative. They preach to you: "The unity of the family must be upheld." Well, look: you must be from a family that is united. Leave the others alone; because if they have died already, how are we going to uphold them?

My wife and I were married on the condition that, if things went badly, there would be a divorce; and each would try to remake his life sincerely.

I know that it is strange, but the right is what cultivates individualism more. Therefore, the right will always choose liberty, and the left, equality. Equality of opportunities and equality of outlets seem perfect to me. But if we want people to be equal upon reaching their destination, you are restricting the individual's liberty, because you must hasten the one who is going slowly and restrain the one who is going fast. What happened in Sweden was real nonsense: In the schools, the backward children were given accelerated courses to make them progress, and the children who were ahead were held back. And that was done in the name of equality.

The left is more messianic. Marxism is a religion, with its infallible dogmas, because the party cannot make a mistake; with its embalmed gods, like Lenin;

with its scriptures, like 'Das Kapital' ...a kind of second-hand, secular religion. For that reason, they have greater discipline. On the left, much is given: "For the party, whatever it may be!" On the right, however, there is strong individuality: "Listen, no one forces me!"

Do you know what I criticize the left for? Because, essentially, it does not like people, and it wants to change them. The conservatives, however, accept them as they are: neither angels nor beasts. Listen: leave people in peace, with their flaws and their virtues, their greatness and their pettiness; because something may possibly be great if it is contrasted with something else petty which makes its greatness stand out. A world without conflict, in which we were all picking little flowers in the parks, would not be an interesting world, at least not for me. Or else we would be at the end of history.

Look, war is never pleasant; it is bloodshed and death. There is no better antidote against it than a photograph of a child killed on a battlefield. The dead children really horrify me. Nevertheless, all societies make war. Not a single exception is known in history. There is not a single peaceful tribe in existence. This is so, and it will not change. Who has said that we are in the world to smile, play the violin and all be blessedly peaceful?

[Question] We could try it, or at least leave those who want to play the violin in peace, isn't that so?

[Answer] No, people are happy when making a four-engine jet plane that can carry 300 persons as well as an atomic bomb. These are the two faces of mankind. You and I are like that. You and I are geniuses, because we have been able to invent the Fifth Symphony; and, at the same time, we are terrifying, because what distinguished us from the *australopithecus africanus* of the animals which lived in the past is that we picked up an antelope's jawbone and smashed our neighbor's head with it.

Many claim that humans are freer the more cultured and less animal-like they are. Well I believe the opposite: humans are free because they retain certain instincts which cannot be manipulated by culture. Thanks be to God, the instincts of sociability, aggressiveness, sexuality or territoriality remain alive in mankind.

[Question] Nevertheless, you approach everything with your brain.

[Answer] The fact is that I am very cold, yes, really! I am very cold, very cerebral. I act quickly, but I gage my steps carefully, in all areas, from the sentimental to the material. I am a mixture, am I not? A mixture of passion and coldness: coldness when it is time to reason, and passion to uphold what I think. My goals are not practical, but my means are.

Cold, practical and restless; he has not stopped moving. He sits on the floor, Arab-style; kneeling, lying down, rising and walking through the living room. He half-reclines on the sofa, clutching the pillow. He tucks in his shirt, which is constantly coming loose; and he adjusts his pants to his belt (he does not imitate Manuel Fraga with suspenders). He laughs to himself, and looks at you suspiciously when you laugh apart from him. And he asks questions. He

is always asking questions, with the pertness of a child who has been granted the privilege of asking questions.

[Question] Are you the "enfant terrible" of Popular Alliance?

[Answer] Why? Well, perhaps I am by nature. I admit that I am provocative.

[Question] Might it not also be due to the fact that this role was assigned to you in the cast of characters?

[Answer] It was not assigned to me. I chose it.

[Question] And do you like it? Are you comfortable with it?

[Answer] Well, not always! Because once in awhile they return the blow to me. But look, there are some things that must be said; someone has to do it. And Fraga must be on top of them. In a party, some think of solutions, and others expose situations. Here, Fraga is the one who thinks, and I am the one who exposes. Maybe some day I shall have to think, and someone else will have to expose. I don't know.

[Question] Do you believe that you will be able to change your image by then?

[Answer] Of course! You create the image. I am a product of four factors: my own effort, my second father, Fraga and the press.

[Question] And are you satisfied with the product?

[Answer] I would remove aggressiveness from it. I would not want it to be more accentuated in me than it is; because the real product is far less aggressive than the product that is being sold. Actually, I am a combative person who is seldom quiet.

I never choose what is easy. There is a saying that I use often: "Even so." The greatness of a cause is to fight for it even though you know that you cannot win. On the day I die, I would like them to say: "Well look, at least he tried."

I am fascinated by the individual who enlists when the war has been lost. I have always been fascinated by lost wars and those who lose them. I have always been delighted by those who are reproached, excluded and misunderstood. Like Julian the apostate, for example. When history proclaims: "That man is the absolute evil," I answer: "Surely not; there must have been something behind it."

And I run away when someone claims to have found the great solution. To Marx, everything depends on classes; to Hitler, there is nothing beyond race; to Freud, let us copulate, and everything else will come by itself. And obviously, this is not so. There are no magic solutions.

I like to pull open closed doors. But do you know what really scares me? Having them close behind me. I delight in opening doors ahead of me, but always watching to make sure that the path behind me remains clear. When I set out on a venture, I have to know that I can return to the starting point.

[Question] In case you are mistaken?

[Answer] So as to be able to correct my mistakes, I suppose. But I fear that some day I shall no longer be able to move backwards.

[Question] What closed doors have you pulled open?

[Answer] Do you think that it is easy to become secretary general of a party at the age of 30? For heaven's sake, if everyone spares your life, and they come advising you because of the little brains that they assume you have.

[Question] And why did you attain the position?

[Answer] Because the people who had kept their spirits until 1977 suddenly lost them; and I was far more steady. They believed that the war had been lost, and they left too soon. I remained.

Also, I suppose that I would prove something in the campaign; because Mr Fraga is hard when it is time to select.

[Question] What did he see in you?

[Answer] I don't know, really. If I knew....

Suddenly, he raises his head in a challenging manner. He assumes the expression of one saying, "let's not fool ourselves," and drops it, in a staccato:

"Sufficient effectiveness, sufficient speed, sufficient intelligence and sufficient loyalty. He saw that. All right? "

He speaks anxiously, moves and almost stops with anxiety. He is in a constant, surprising state of anxiety. He has the Fraga pace; it is made in the Fraga model, in his image and likeness.

[Question] Aren't you concerned that when there is talk about you it always ends with talk about Fraga?

There is a silence. He shrugs his shoulders and smiles.

[Answer] Look, I was going to give you an answer and I stopped. I was going to tell you: it doesn't matter to me. And then I thought: Heavens, one doesn't have to exaggerate either!

Of course I am thinking of my own political career, but first I want to do a few things. I said that I would take Fraga to Moncloa, even if on a donkey. And I shall take him. We are taking him. At first, we made the journey on a donkey, later on a motor scooter and now we are traveling in a CX.

If a politician tells you that he has no personal ambitions, run away, because he is lying, or he has the wrong vocation. Politics seeks the solution to problems. And solutions are put into practice if you have sufficient power to implement them. In other words, any politician wants the maximum amount of power possible, to remedy his country's problems. OK?

[Question] You seem very altruistic to me. But power is something more, is it not?

[Answer] Yes, later, when you already have it, it becomes a drug. For example, speaking in public is awfully hallucinogenic: 10,000 people applauding you intoxicate you with sensations. Something ancestral erupts from you, forcing you to positions that you would not assume at other times. And you say what you would not say in different circumstances. The greatest danger is the pleasure of exercising power for its own sake.

The best thing for a politician to do is to shave in the morning, look in the mirror and laugh at himself: "Look, So-and-So, don't overdo it, because you and I know that you are not such a genius as they tell you that you are."

[Question] I suppose there are not many politicians who laugh at themselves.

His face contracts into a malicious little laugh.

[Answer] I'm afraid there are very few. Humans in general have a very slight capacity for laughing at themselves. Isn't that so?

[Question] What is your personal ambition?

And he enumerates again the goals of his party, the ideals of Popular Alliance.

[Answer] I want to do something for my country, through my party.

[Question] But, what about your ambition? (I begin to wonder whether I should run away.)

[Answer] Well, a ministry that would delight me. But no! I cannot say that.

He is silent and smiles.

"I have always been fascinated by the Ministry of Interior."

I look at him, puzzled.

[Question] But that is a dreadful ministry, is it not?

[Answer] Yes, the most difficult, the one which wears one out most. But in it many things can be accomplished.

[Question] And one must have very special ability and traits to be minister of interior.

His face, amid smiles, is that of a child caught misbehaving.

[Answer] I suppose so, after all. Well, all right, I retract what I said.

[Question] No, don't retract it. Perhaps it reflects you more than the whole interview.

[Answer] Yes, it is retracted; I am defeating myself. Because, you see, it would appear that I was an individual obsessed with order, and I am not. You know it already: I love order as a means of achieving liberty. And this can be accomplished in an intelligent manner from the Ministry of Interior. But, look out! That is a long-term aspiration of mine, for some unknown distant future. For now, at the moment, I shall try to be a deputy. All right?

He turns his head sharply. His entire being is a combination of sudden movements, crackling sounds, taut twists, cutting words and clipped endings: "OK?" OK. ""Is that so?" That is so. "All right, good, let's continue."

[Question] Has your physical appearance benefited you?

[Answer] Well, what about my physical appearance?

[Question] They have chosen you as one of the most attractive Spaniards. Do you think that Spain is prepared for its politicians to be attractive?

[Answer] A woman must always be prepared for a man to be attractive. Furthermore, that selection was only kindness on the part of those female reporters; so long as a image of frivolity is not given! And I, of course, am not frivolous.

[Question] You are an unusual person, with that light quality resembling the Hitler youth.

[Answer] But why? Because I am blond and wear glasses? And what can I change about that?

[Question] Nothing, of course; but since you are on the right, I suppose that image of yours typifies you.

[Answer] Typifying is all right at the outset, because it differentiates you, it individualizes you; but, watch out! Later you have to prove that the difference is positive.

[Question] The worst thing is not being; it is never bad to be too much. However, in Congress the majority of politicians are grayer.

[Answer] Ah, yes? Well, you will see; between Alfonso Guerra, Enrique Curiel and me, we shall change that.

And he laughs with assurance, amused.

When the torture of photographs comes, his assurance disappears. He does not listen to the questions; while improvising quick answers, the corner of his right eye follows Luis' movements attentively, and his ear quivers at every "click" of the machine. He shrugs, sinks into the sofa, his gaze flees the lens, he frowns; he does not know how to hide, and takes refuge in the embrace of Eric, his year and a half old son. On that occasion, he has the somewhat touching aspect of a child caught by surprise; his 33 years are cut to the height of adolescence, and the shyness, that predicted shyness, puts an end to his entire image as a provocative politician.

[Answer] The fact is that I am shy, I am; and I experience it inevitably. When I stand at the end of a rally, and raise my arms in this way, I wish that a lightning bolt would strike me! And when I have to greet people, I bend my head and think: "Get me out of here!" I can even blush. I cannot manage to be a smiling, overwhelming politician.

[Question] Well, you seem very convinced, very assured.

[Answer] Not so assured. I have been mistaken, and I shall be mistaken often. But I am an individual who adjusts. I think what I think until someone comes and proves the contrary to me; provided they prove it to me. OK?

[Question] But no one forces you to say what you do not wish to say, do they? They have accused you of not having expressed an opinion on the 23-F sentences.

[Answer] There was no other position; those sentences are not firm. One cannot do what the president of the government does: "I am familiar with the penalties. I have not read the sentences, but I think...." Heavens, no! So how do you set about expressing an opinion?

[Question] They claim that you are going about in desperation because the whole Francoist roster is infiltrating Fraga.

[Answer] That is not true. They have approached, of course; but they have not entered. This morning, I vetoed two. At first, I thought that it would be a problem. I even went so far as to make the remark, "the 'sorcerers' will not return here." They have nothing to do, either as candidates or as members. Fraga is not upset; he knows that they are coming, and that they will leave when they find that they are not included on any list. I am more nervous. I see them coming, and I say to myself: "They will stay, just the same." But Fraga is right. They always end up leaving.

In this party I have the reputation of being the greatest hunter of "messes" in the house. And I am not so hard as is claimed, either.

[Question] Does one feel important when they begin attacking him?

[Answer] No, they attack you when you are already important. Since the Andalucian campaign, they have started to become involved with me. Before that, they did not even mention me.

If we had had 3 more months in Andalucia, the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] would not have won as it did. And if we have enough time in the general elections, of course we can win! Time and a non-proliferation of the groups to the right, so that the votes will not be divided among intermediate parties. What is certain is that not even a trace of UCD [Democratic Center Union] will remain.

UCD is the party of 5 percent, because that is what it will obtain in the next elections. To use a term of the ethologists (ethology is the science which studies animal behavior), UCD is in a state of "stupor"; like the animal that

has received such a severe shock that it does not know how to attack or flee, and it remains this way, without reacting.

It is obvious: the Democratic Center Union has died as a party. The weapon of the useful vote is no longer even worthwhile: "Listen! Vote for Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, or else Felipe Gonzalez or his equivalent will come and nationalize your stone hammer." Since Galicia, that argument has had its wings brushed; but now, in Andalucia, so many shots have hit it that no even a wing is left on it.

At the present time, UCD is being maintained in the government by national mercy. It has been a long time since it carried a project out through its own forces. The Centrists are paying for the great mistake of having thought that they had elected it to be there, not to govern. There is no government, and the country has become tired. The greatness of the democratic system consists of being able to take a piece of paper and say: "Look, So-and-So, I voted for you 4 years ago because you told me that you were going to do everything listed in this book; and you have not done so. And, since you cannot take me for a fool all your life, now your father will vote for you."

In Europe, the Centrists are nothing more than the hands on the scale; and in every scale-pan the two great parties, conservative and progressive, are placed. But, when the center attempts to be everything simultaneously, it is nothing but the national movement, with a voting ticket. And, in the end, it dies, just as UCD has died.

[Question] Mr Carrillo is greatly concerned about that bipolarization which is occurring in Spanish politics.

[Answer] Mr Carrillo is concerned that he will disappear in that bipolarization. But, look, from a political standpoint Mr Carrillo is now very little, is he not? He doesn't have much choice: either he disappears as secretary-general of his party, or his party disappears. But, in any event, he will disappear.

How long can a party such as the PC [Communist Party] survive, with such a clear-cut contradiction between its deeds and doctrine? It will end up exploding.

The same thing will happen to the Socialist Party. The nationalizations are a trap for the PSOE, because they have to prove to their rank and file that they intend to nationalize something; and, on the other hand, they must appease the business owners, so that panic will not spread. Therefore, they attempt to nationalize the high-tension networks, but they never mention the companies.

He emphasizes, loading the adverbs with stress: never, ever, always; all of which fills his assertions with force. At times, he speaks hastily, and swallows syllables, and a certain French accent comes and goes in his very pure Andalucian speech. At times, the word is dominant; like an actor who plays with the silences, with the slightest pauses and with the vibrant tones. Or else he acts like a professor to explain his party's political lesson.

"We shall stop talking about the natural majority. With whom would we form it? What votes does UCD have? You can already see: what was previously the sun, is

now a satellite of Jupiter. There will be no ridiculous concessions, when, at best, we can dispense with them. We have always been very magnanimous. Now, we shall set the terms ourselves. All right?

"Of course an agreement with all possible forces is of interest to us; because socialism is a fat slice, and to make it, everything that can be added must be added. But listen, if UCD makes it, all well and good; and if UCD does not succeed in doing so, we shall make it ourselves."

And as he talks about Popular Alliance and the entire future of Popular Alliance, his voice and facial expression become brightened.

Once again, the 33 years: the great enthusiasm, the love of words, the lack of criticism for the white, the total rejection for the black, the hurling of oneself into a dive, the capacity for personal sacrifice....

Nevertheless, when the time comes to chair the monthly meeting of the AP central body, the politician emerges from him. He overcomes age, and grows; he exhibits poise and effectiveness. He continues his constant movement, jumps, becomes settled, and rocks in the chair while speaking. He flutters his hands like an orchestra leader and, with a sharp pointing of a finger, introduces each soloist. When disturbed, he strikes the table: "Let's see! Please! I can't hear!" When there is laughter at the wrong time, he gives a reproachful glance. And when someone, improperly, has the notion to make threats, he turns around, possessed of the wrath of the just. He listens, absorbed, weighs arguments and plans his refutations. But he accepts ideas, introduces issues, and lends the meeting his great speed and his tremendous pace. And very capable people yield to such a display of authority.

"I am not authoritarian! An authoritarian is an individual who does not allow others to speak."

An authoritarian is one who acts on the basis of his authority.

He bends his head and smiles.

"All right, OK, retracted."

2909

CSO: 3110/182

POLL SHOWS THAT SUPPORT FOR WAGE EARNER FUND STILL DROPPING

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Jul 82 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] Public support for the proposal by the Social Democrats and the LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions] to establish wage earner funds has dropped sharply since last winter. The number of fund supporters has dropped by 6 percent to 26 percent, while the number of opponents has risen by 9 percent to 51 percent. This means that only one voter out of four thinks the fund proposal is good for the country, while every second voter thinks it is bad.

This is shown by the fourth DAGENS NYHETER-IMU [Institute for Market Research] public opinion poll on wage earner funds. The poll was conducted in the period from 17 May through 14 June and involved slightly over 1,000 voters.

Opposition to the funds is hardening even within the two big wage earner organizations (the LO and the TCO [Central Organization of Salaried Employees]), in which the leadership supports wage earner funds. Almost every second LO member (45 percent) opposes the funds, and in the TCO, 65 percent feel that the fund proposal is bad for the country.

The question put to the voters was whether the proposal by the Social Democrats and the LO to establish wage earner funds was good or bad for the country.

The final result for the June poll is as follows: 26 percent feel that the proposal is "very good" or "rather good" for the country, while 51 percent feel that it is "rather bad" or "very bad," and 23 percent say they do not know.

The figure in the DAGENS NYHETER-IMU poll for fund supporters is approximately 10 percent higher than in other polls asking a similar question. In those polls, the voters are asked to say only whether they are "for" or "against" the funds.

Equally Divided

The first DAGENS NYHETER-IMU poll on wage earner funds was conducted in September 1981. At that time, supporters and opponents were equally divided: 37 percent felt that the fund proposal was good for the country, and 36 percent felt that it was bad.

The results of the first poll were reported at about the same time that the Social Democrats and the LO were holding their congresses--at which the wage earner funds were a major item on the agenda.

Since the first poll, the gap between supporters and opponents of the wage earner funds has widened except for a slight contraction in February of this year, when 32 percent felt that the fund proposal was good for the country and 42 percent felt that it was bad.

Increasing Opposition

Compared to the February poll, the number of voters who felt in June that the fund proposal was "very good" or "rather good" dropped by 6 percent to 26 percent. Statistically, that decline is certain. Only 5 percent of the voters felt that the fund proposal was "very good" for the country. Over the entire period in which the polls were taken--almost a year--the number of fund supporters has dropped by 11 percent: from 37 to 26 percent.

Since February, the number of opponents of the fund has risen by 9 percent to 51 percent. Especially striking is the increase in the number choosing the response "very bad." They have risen from 16 to 28 percent.


Over the entire period of the polls, opposition to the funds has increased from 36 to 51 percent--that is, by 15 percent.

The number of uncertain voters has dropped from 27 to 23 percent in 1 year. The voters taking a stand now seem to have wound up overwhelmingly among the opponents.

The Social Democratic Party and the LO have proposed the establishment of wage earner funds. In your opinion, would it be good or bad for the country if that fund proposal were adopted?

	1981 (%)		1982 (%)	
	September	December	February	June
Very good	7	7	6	5
Rather good	30	23	26	21
Rather bad	20	22	20	23
Very bad	16	21	22	28
Don't know	27	27	26	23
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

The polls were conducted using a nationally representative controlled sampling of Swedes between the ages of 15 and 74. The interviews were conducted by visiting homes during the periods in question. The number of interviews totaled approximately 1,000 in each poll.



Opposition to the proposal by the Social Democrats and the LO to establish wage earner funds has been growing gradually, according to the four public opinion polls conducted concerning those funds. At first, the supporters and opponents of the funds were equally divided. But now one out of every four voters supports the funds, and every second voter opposes them. Opposition to the funds has also grown among the Social Democratic Party's voters, but especially among the supporters of the nonsocialist parties.

Key:

1. Bad proposal
2. Good proposal
3. Not sure

Undecided Socialists

The largest number of undecided voters is on the socialist side. The June poll shows that 29 percent of the Social Democrats said they didn't know in response to the question of whether the funds were good or bad for the country, compared to 27 percent for the VPK [Left Party-Communists] and an average of only 11 percent for the three nonsocialist parties.

Among the nonsocialist parties, the Conservatives are most certain, and the Center Party's members are the least certain. Only 3 percent of the Conservatives said they did not know in response to the fund question, compared to 11 percent for the Liberal Party and 26 percent for the Center Party.

No Shift Between Blocs

The poll makes it clear that the fund proposal is not attracting any new voters to the Social Democrats. On the other hand, there is nothing to indicate that the opposition felt by faithful Social Democratic voters is strong enough to induce them to cross the boundary between the blocs.

Among the Social Democrats, the fund's supporters slipped from 58 percent in September 1981 to 49 percent in June of this year. At the same time, the number of opponents rose from 13 to 22 percent.

The fund's supporters among the VPK's voters dropped from 64 percent last fall to 52 percent this summer. During the same period, the number of opponents rose from 13 to 20 percent.

It is especially among the nonsocialist voters--above all those supporting the Liberal and Center Parties--that opposition to the funds has hardened over the past year.

Fund supporters in the Conservative Party fell from 5 percent in September 1981 to 1 percent in June of this year. During the same period, the number of opponents rose from 82 to 96 percent.

Fund supporters among the Center Party's voters dropped from 22 to 4 percent, while opponents increased from 41 to 70 percent.

Among the Liberal Party's voters, the number of fund supporters dropped from 24 to 11 percent, while the number of opponents rose from 41 to 81 percent.

In the other parties--including the Environment Party and the KDS [Christian Democratic Party], among others--supporters of the funds have increased from 16 to 22 percent over the past year, while opponents have dropped from 60 to 56 percent. If we look at the figures for the two political blocs as such, we see that fund supporters in the socialist parties dropped from 59 percent in September of last year to 49 percent in June of this year, while the number of opponents increased from 13 to 22 percent.

Among voters in the three nonsocialist parties, the fund supporters dropped from 13 to 3 percent, and fund opponents rose from 68 to 86 percent.

LO and TCO

The shift in opinion is similar even among the members of the wage earner organizations.

In September 1981, 52 percent of the LO's members approved of the fund proposal. The figure has now dropped to 30 percent. At the same time, the number of opponents is up from 21 to 45 percent.

In the TCO, 36 percent of the members were for the funds in September 1981, but only 25 percent supported them in June of this year. During the same period, the number of fund opponents rose from 44 to 61 percent.

Other Form of Funds?

Voters who disapproved of the Social Democratic-LO funds were asked by the IMU if they wanted another form of fund instead or no funds at all.

A minority of those questioned--15 percent--said they wanted funds of another kind. On the other hand, the number choosing the alternative answer--no funds at all--has risen from just under 40 percent (37 percent in February) to 54 percent. At the same time, the number saying they "don't know" has fallen from 45 to 31 percent.

11798

CSO: 3109/202

PAPER CRITICIZES 'FUND,' COMMENTS ON DECLINE IN SUPPORT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Jul 82 p 2

[Editorial by Nils-Eric Sandberg]

[Text] "We must be willing to consider everyone's viewpoint within the framework of those principles we regard as binding.... We cannot veto anyone, but I would like to say that I expect it to be possible to create a broad base of support for the wage earner funds."

So said Olof Palme in a TV interview in March. But a broad base of support for the wage earner funds does not exist yet--not among the citizens. According to the public opinion poll by the IMU [Institute for Market Research] that is being published in today's DAGENS NYHETER, 26 percent feel that the fund proposal is good, 51 percent consider it bad, and 23 percent do not know.

As a "broad base of support," 26 percent is pretty slim.

A public opinion poll must naturally be viewed with great reservation: the margin for an error in measurement is wide. But the IMU's figures are reliable as a rough indicator because they agree with a trend revealed in a long series of public opinion polls since 1975 on the precise question of the wage earner funds. Different institutes have asked different questions, which may explain why the responses vary from series to series. But according to all the polls, the percentage in favor of the funds falls within the range of 15 to 30 percent, while between 40 and 70 percent give a definite no.

At the same time, just as many polls shows a level of support for the Social Democrats that is far larger than the support for the funds. The explanation must be that the majority sees the funds as a secondary issue in the election. Why?

Partly because the loudest opposition to the funds comes from the business community, which may be suspected of speaking for the interests of the firms.

Partly because the Social Democrats present the issue as a purely technical arrangement for solving all problems: it will increase investment and employment, increase real wages, and level out ownership.

That is not how it was at the beginning. Meidner's 1975 proposal emphasizes that the funds will not worry about capital formation but will transfer power and ownership in the firms to the union. And that is the main thing.

The funds will concentrate power over investments and production in the small group that now controls the union organizations and the one that controls the political apparatus. According to all the polls, only a small minority wants the funds being described by the Social Democrats as "democratization."

A majority of the members of the TCO [Central Organization of Salaried Employees] do not want the funds. How was that opinion reflected in the decision by the TCO leadership and the TCO congress?

11798

CSO: 3109/202

STATUS, PROBLEMS WITH TORNADO IN FRG, UK, ITALY

Brussels LA CONQUETE DE L'AIR/AVIASTRO in English May 82 pp 32-34

[Text]

PRODUCTION

312 aircraft are now being structurally assembled. Annual production rate is presently 110 machines - 44 in the UK, 42 in the FRG and 24 in Italy — which corresponds to an output of nine aircraft per month. 105 Tornados have been assigned so far to the Services : 43 are operational at the Tri-National Tornado Training Establishment of Cottesmore, 36 at the Tornado Weapon Conversion Unit located at RAF Honington and the rest at the Luftwaffe's Weapon Conversion Unit at Erding near Munich. It's expected that by end of 1982, 150 aircraft belonging to the first series two batches will have been delivered to their respective customer. Panavia states that introduction at squadron level is imminent : if so, conversion to Tornado should start within days at RAF Squadron N° 9 at Honington and early July at the Marinefliegergeschwader 1 at Jagel.

FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT

As already emphasized in Aviaastro's status report of May 1981, most flight tasks required for Initial Operation Clearance are now completed. Tornado prototypes, pre-production and production aircraft have logged a total of 15,000 flight hours. However, tests are still carried out with the Tornado Terrain Following Radar. Civilian pilots have flown at night at 250 ft (80 m) in the manual and 350 ft (115 m) in the automatic mode. Throughout the whole operational envelope bombs, air-to-air and air-to-ship missiles and gun have been used in different attack profiles.

RAF AIR-DEFENSE VARIANT (ADV)

During a combat air patrol mission, one ADV aircraft loitered 4 hours 13 minutes without air/air refuelling, on a sortie of 325 nm (602 km) first to the combat air patrol area, followed by a combat air patrol sweep of 2 hours 20

minutes and return flight. For this mission the ADV AOI prototype carried four SkyFlash, two Sidewinders and two 1500 litre subsonic drop tanks. To date, three ADV prototypes have logged over 400 flight hours. First production aircraft will be available end of 1983.

PRODUCT SUPPORT

Thanks to the high system redundancy and independence of the Tornado from ground support servitude, after 10,000 flight hours, the system failure ratio is lower than foreseen; therefore, repair and overhaul capacity doesn't have to be met to full extent. Planned monthly flying rate of 25 hours has consequently been increased to 40 hours. « Non-bureaucratic on the spot Supply » is enhanced by the « Spare Parts Progression Cell » which services all Tornado units in the UK, FRG and Italy. This outfit has already dealt with 3,500 enquiries these last ten months.

ACHIEVEMENTS IN PERFORMANCE

According to Panavia, the Tornado definitely features all-weather combat capability; excellent flight characteristics throughout the flight envelope; automatic low level penetration at transonic speeds and in all conditions of visibility; stol-capability; outstanding payload/range (endurance) performance; autonomous high precision navigation and flight guidance; highly accurate target acquisition, weapon aiming and weapon delivery; high weapon payload and broad weapon spectrum (air-to-ground, air-to-air, air-to-ship); adaptability to future weapon developments; reduced vulnerability; independence of ground equipment; reduced maintenance requirement, increased technical availability.

WEAPON AIMING AND DELIVERY

A Panavia executive summary reads: A target is acquired the same way as a navigational fixpoint by means of the pilot's head-up display (visual), the radar (blind) or with a search laser for a precise target. As the main computer stores the weapon characteristic equations necessary to calculate the correct point for weapon release, the navigation sensors provide aircraft flight vector, wind speed, drift angle and aircraft attitude; also the exact target position indicated by the laser/radar or laser/HUD combination.

The Tornado is able to deliver a wide range of armament against both planned targets and targets of opportunity in different attack profiles.

For planned targets: air-to-ground guns; straight-pass attack, retarded bombs either direct or with off-set point; dive attack, bombs; loft attack, bombs and air-to-surface missiles.

For targets of opportunity: air-to-ground rockets, guns; bombs using continuously computed impact line; bombs

using continuously computed impact line plus laser marked target receiver; air-to-surface missiles; air-to-air gunnery; radar; hot-line gun and stadiametric ranging; sidewinder attacks.

TACTICAL NAVAL ROLE

The BundesMarine's three major tasks are sea surveillance, reconnaissance and attacks against enemy shipping and coastal installations. Both sea surveillance and reconnaissance is a simple responsibility, owed to the Tornado's navigation system, radar performance and accuracy of the camera and recording systems. A couple of improvements have been introduced to current production aircraft: radar height-hold mode within the autopilot and moving target circulation. During recent trials in the North Sea, a navy pilot was able to fly in radar height-hold mode at 100 ft (30 m) during an attack against merchant ships.

When harmonizing the autopilot with the auto-attack steering software of the main computer, the Tornado is said to be capable of attacking moving targets with hands off the joy-stick. Moreover, in order to obtain a better performance ratio from Kormoran air-to-surface missiles, these moving target calculations should improve the hit probability considerably, according to FregattenKapitän M. Frey. The automatic attack modes - at 200 ft for instance - should also relieve the two-man crew from the high stress of holding the aircraft manually at very low altitude during 32° dive attacks.

A LUFTWAFFE NAVIGATOR'S POINT OF VIEW

According to Major J. Neumann, problems arise when « he is flown by an autopilot at night, at high speeds, low level, in poor weather conditions, not only over water but also overland », « What happens if a target of higher interest is spotted? If a target-change is ordered while you are airborne? What if a diversion from a pre-set course is rendered necessary preventing planned navigation updating? » The answer lies with the rear-seater's dialogue with a computer that stores 64,000 bits of information to backup the pilot with data he might need within seconds. As the pilots concentrate on his flying, the navigator concentrates on navigation, mapping, radar control, interfacing with the main computer and selecting stores and weapon aiming and delivery. To alleviate all above problems, the Tornado is provided with Doppler radar (5 navigation modes) and secondary attitude and heading reference.

What degree of trustworthiness can be given in the reliability of an autopilot system, when one flies « at ultra low level, terrain following and even manually whenever required », then asks Major Neumann? To date Tornado pilots still maintain the « normal step-down phase to come down from cleared 1000 ft to 750, 500 even at 350 ft ». For the system it doesn't matter much if the flight path is at 1500 ft or 500 ft, day and night, under adverse weather conditions. Provided the navigator « has a good lookout throughout the mission to handle the ECM and ECCM hardware without being overstressed by normal flight requirements », all is well... That's quite a mouthful!

COMMENTS FROM THE RAF

Wing Commander D. Griffiths, stationed at the Tornado Weapon Conversion Unit located at Honington, notes that people always want to pin him down and ask him exactly what the bombscores are. « We dropped over 2000 practice bombs. We also practiced all the bombing modes, including the low level laydown which is the high speed low level attack, the conventional type of attack using a shallow dive with visually aimed weapons through the HUD and the loft attack which is a stand-off delivery from pulling up some four miles away from the target. Our results in those have been that on the blind bombing side you can expect a reasonable crew to get their bombs well inside 100 ft. If you think about that as an all-weather action, that is really quite outstanding and at an order of perhaps three or four times better than we had before ».

The Wing Commander was also « pleasantly surprised » when he found out that skilled crews could get their bombs within 75 ft during silent visual attacks. He « beamed » when on loft attacks an average of 500 to 600 bombs had fallen about 200 ft.

On the radar side, added Griffiths, when attacking radar targets overland, we found out that we have to rethink our radar tracking techniques. The radar is so good, that what should be a prominent radar target is really no longer any use and you need to look for very small pinpoint positions. « To illustrate his assessment, during one attack the crew of a Tornado identified a telephone cable that had been laid in front of the target area. The cable was dug two feet deep, there was a little ridge about two inches high which painted a clear line on the radarscope...

The « finale » of today's status report is voiced by Lt Colonel Pollice of the Italian Air Force. As one of the few Italians flying currently the Tornado he conceded that « everything has been going well, up to now. We've had obviously English language problems. Not only do you learn a lot in the air but also in the crew room or in the bar, particularly when you talk about things which are done at home and when you realize why they are doing things differently ». Isn't this a dandy conclusion ?

CSO: 3120/78

NEW SOUTHERN AREA HQ TO BETTER COORDINATE OPERATIONS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Jul 82 p 5

[Article by Knut Falchenberg: "Defense Will Coordinate--War Command to Stavanger"]

[Text] It has been decided that the war headquarters for South Norway, which is located in a hardened site in the mountain under Holmenkollen, will be moved to Stavanger. AFTENPOSTEN has learned that the defense leadership accelerated the final choice of location on account of an ongoing expansion of computer-controlled data systems.

The commander in chief of South Norway, Vice Admiral Robert Helseth, told AFTENPOSTEN that the operational portion of the headquarters will probably be moved in 1985. It will affect between 30 and 40 personnel directly. The peaceful part of the headquarters--the part that is located above ground--will remain in Oslo somewhat longer.


It has already become known that NATO, through its infrastructure program, has set aside money to plan the move. Today the South Norway command is divided such that air and land activities are directed from the bunker under Holmenkollen, while ships, submarines and maritime aircraft are directed from a mountain near Stavanger. This division has made it difficult to attain the purpose of the headquarters, namely to coordinate war operations in the different weapons branches. Also, the foreign forces which will come to Norway are assumed to be under the command of Norwegian generals and admirals who lead the command. These forces therefore look forward to a geographic assembling of all the links at Stavanger.

Another complaint against the location at Holmenkollen is that this mountain installation is located only a few kilometers from the Northern Nato Command headquarters at Kolsas. This means that if an enemy takes out one command location, it must be expected that the other can be knocked out in a short time. A third aspect is that the Holmenkollen installation is already too small, and furthermore requires modernization.

Now that it has been decided to assemble the South Norway command in the Stavanger area, this gives a great advantage to the experts who are now working on a revolutionary command and control system in Norway. In the first place the three most important commands in Norway--Kolsas, Stavanger and Bodo--will be tied together in a data net. This net will also reach the most important bases for the air defense of the country. In a war the system will be able to handle enormous amounts of information, both on our own and enemy activities. In fractions of seconds the military commanders will be able to call forth all the data they need to make their decisions, and orders which before could take minutes or hours to reach the recipients will in the future be coded automatically and transmitted over the entire country without delays. After the air defense is connected, probably the army's air defense units will be the next which will benefit from the data-operated command and control system. Later will come the rest of the army and the navy, according to information learned by AFTENPOSTEN.

When this system is finally completed, the wartime command will be able in an entirely different way than today to utilize the forces effectively. The soldiers, aircraft and ships being controlled by a data terminal will have received their requirements in ammunition and equipment. Because an attacker can not be stopped by computers alone.

[Photo and caption on next page]



Caption: The mountain installation near Stavanger which today controls fleet movements will be expanded to also control operations on the land and in the air. Computer terminals will replace blackboards and looseleaf systems.

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ARMY DECIDES TO RENOVATE OLD TANKS RATHER THAN BUILD NEW

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Jun 82 p 8

[Article by Erik Liden]

[Text] The army is facing its own JAS affair--a decision on a new tank to replace the S tank. To avoid another discussion of the type surrounding the JAS aircraft, the army has now requested authorization to renovate the 600 or so tanks of various models that it has today.

No one at Army Headquarters is venturing to speculate on what a new tank will cost in the 1990's, which is when the project will come up for discussion. Indications are that it will be at least 10 billion kronor at today's prices.

Army Chief of Staff Nils Skold told SVENSKA DAGBLADET: "As a result of the renovations which the government has now approved for the Centurion tanks and which, I hope, it will soon approve for the S tanks, we can postpone the discussion of tanks until the end of the 1980's. I believe that the 1987 and 1992 defense decisions can both be made without a definite answer concerning the new tank."

Cost: 400 Million Kronor

It is estimated that renovating the Centurion tanks will cost between 350 and 400 million kronor. For that amount, the army will get new engines for most of its tanks, a new laser sight and computer for fire control, and composite armor for greater protection. The tanks can then be used until 1995.

It is estimated that similar renovation of the S tank would cost about 450 million kronor, and in this case, there is also talk of replacing the gun to achieve higher muzzle velocity and greater effectiveness against modern armor.

Col Bjorn Zickerman, inspector of armored troops, says: "Only if the gun can also be replaced will it be possible to put off a decision on a new tank, because in that case the S tank can be used even after the turn of the century. If that renovation is too expensive, it may become appropriate to buy a foreign tank."

Meanwhile, tests are continuing with the new light combat vehicle known as the XX-20, which was recently presented to the mass media for the first time. It

is a 23-ton armored vehicle with a 12cm gun, with the vehicle being articulated in the middle to improve navigability.

Sweden First

Sweden is the first country in the world to try to equip a light vehicle with a heavy gun of the type normally mounted on tanks weighing over 50 tons.

Zickerman says: "It is still too early to say whether the attempt will succeed. The intention was that three light vehicles with guns or heavy missiles would replace one tank of the current type. Current cost developments indicate that we will barely be able to get two new vehicles instead. The only way to make the project cheaper is to reduce the weight, meaning that there would be room for only a light gun or missile, with a sizable reduction in effectiveness and protection for the conscripts."

The new XX-20 is not a tank and could not be used in assaults over open terrain. It would operate under the protection of the terrain and be grouped in prepared positions, from where it would fire a few shots and then move quickly to the next position. Mobility is therefore the priority. The decisive element in the project is whether the articulation between the two components can be made cheaper than a traditional steering system using tracks.

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